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THE PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION
UNDER CERCLA: NAVIGATING THE
INTERSECTION OF SECTIONS
107(A) AND 113(F)
Jeffrey M. Gaba*
The Comprehensive Environmental, Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) provides three distinct “private” causes of action that allow parties to recover all or part of their cleanup costs from “potentially responsible parties.” Section 107(a)(4)(B) provides a “direct” right of cost recovery. Sections
113(f)(1) and 113(f)(3)(B) provide a right of contribution following a CERCLA
civil action or certain judicial or administrative settlements.
The relationship among these causes of action has been the source of considerable confusion. Two Supreme Court cases, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall
Services, Inc. and United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. have identified
certain situations in which the causes of action exclusively apply, but the Court
has left considerable confusion about the appropriate cause or causes of action in a
number of other common situations. These include situations in which costs are
directly incurred as an obligation under an administrative settlement or following
a CERCLA civil action.
This Article provides a rational approach to allocating rights of cost recovery
among sections 107(a), 113(f)(1), and 113(f)(3)(B) that is consistent both with the
language of CERCLA and the Supreme Court’s analysis in Cooper and Atlantic Research. First, the Article evaluates the rather unsatisfying rationales asserted by the U.S. courts of appeals for determining whether the causes of action
under 107(a) and 113(f) are mutually exclusive. The Article suggests that the
proper resolution focuses on whether there is textual overlap among the sections.
Quite simply, in the event of textual overlap, standard canons of construction and
the express text of section 113(f)(3)(B), not discussed by any of the courts of
appeals, suggest that 113(f) provides the exclusive cause of action for cost recovery
under CERCLA.
Second, the Article evaluates the textual scope of the causes of action and
whether costs incurred in a variety of common situations thus fall within the scope
of 107(a)(4)(B) or 113(f). Both the specific text and the Supreme Court’s approach, particularly its focus on the “traditional” meaning of contribution, can
help resolve these issues. The result of this analysis is a straightforward applica* Jeffrey M. Gaba is the M.D. Anderson Foundation endowed Professor of Health
Law, Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas. He
received his Master of Public Health from Harvard University in 1989, his J.D. from
Columbia Law School in 1976, and his Bachelor of Arts from the University of California
Santa Barbara in 1972. Mr. Gaba is currently Of Counsel at Gardere Wynne Sewell, LLP in
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tion of the statute that results in a consistent and coherent structure to CERCLA
that both provides incentives for cleanup and helps ensure that the polluter pays.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts have frequently grappled with whether and how PRPs may recoup
CERCLA-related costs from other PRPs. The questions lie at the intersection of two statutory provisions—CERCLA §§ 107(a) and 113(f).1
Navigating the interplay between these sections is not easy.2
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 stands as one of the central pillars of federal
environmental law.3 Through CERCLA, Congress established mechanisms
both to promote the remediation of property contaminated by hazardous
substances and, as importantly, to ensure that the cost of cleanup is spread
equitably among responsible parties. In other words, CERCLA was intended to ensure that property is cleaned up and that the polluter pays.4
Although CERCLA provides the federal government with powerful
tools to achieve these goals, one of its major innovations is the creation of
private causes of action that allow private parties to recover their costs of
cleanup and allocate these costs among other responsible parties. Under section 107(a)(4)(B), private parties have a “direct” right to recover from responsible parties the cleanup costs they “directly incur.”5 Under sections
113(f)(1) and 113(f)(3)(B) parties have a right of “contribution” to recover
an equitable share of cleanup costs they have paid “during or following” a
CERCLA civil action or in certain approved administrative or judicial
settlements.6
The relationship between these three causes of action has been and remains a critical issue that affects the operation of the statute. In Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the statu1.
United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 131 (2007).
2.
Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2014).
3.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(2013)); Martina E. Cartwright, Superfund: It’s No Longer Super and It Isn’t Much of a Fund, 18
TUL. ENVTL . L.J. 299, 300 (2005).
4.
See Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 226 (3d Cir.
2010); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2009).
5.
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
6.
CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (providing an express right of contribution “during or following” a civil action under CERCLA); CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (providing an express right of contribution for persons who have
resolved their liability to the United States or state governments in a “judicially or administratively approved settlement”); see infra notes 38–43 and accompanying text (discussing the
private causes of action).
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tory right of contribution under 113(f) was not available to persons who had
voluntarily incurred costs without a prior or pending CERCLA civil action
or approved administrative or judicial settlement.7 Three years later, in
United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., the Court held that the “direct cause
of action” under 107(a)(4)(B) was available to persons who had directly incurred costs to voluntarily clean up property.8 Following Cooper and Atlantic
Research, it was clear that persons who had voluntarily “incurred” cleanup
costs were limited to cost recovery under section 107(a)(4)(B) and persons
who had “reimbursed” others following a civil action or certain judicial or
administrative settlements could only recover their costs through an action
for contribution under section 113(f).
The Court, however, left a number of critical questions unresolved.
Which cause of action applies if a party “involuntarily” incurs cleanup costs
responding to a government order? Which cause of action applies if a party
has settled with the government and agrees both to reimburse the government and to directly spend additional money on cleanup? What types of
settlements will trigger the right of contribution? The line between the direct cause of action and the action for contribution, although sharper following Cooper and Atlantic Research, remains blurred.
And the choice of cause of action matters. The standard for recovery
under 107(a)(4)(B) is “joint and several”; under 113(f) the standard is one of
“equitable allocation.”9 The statute of limitations for cost recovery under
107(a)(4)(B) can be up to six years following commencement of the
cleanup; the statute of limitations under 113(f) is three years from the date
of judgment or settlement.10 Persons settling with the government can be
protected from subsequent claims for contribution under 113(f), but they
remain liable for actions under 107(a)(4)(B).11
Since Cooper and Atlantic Research, U.S. courts of appeals in seven different circuits have addressed the circumstances of when claims under
107(a)(4)(B) or 113(f) can be asserted.12 Although each court has concluded
that the causes of action are mutually exclusive, the approach and rationale
advanced by these courts has been inconsistent and, in some cases, unconvincing. Further, they have varied in their treatment of the scope of these
sections. Courts have yet to develop a coherent answer to the question of
how to allocate rights of cost recovery between 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f).
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 158 (2004).
United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 131–32 (2007).
See infra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 53, 95–96 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 120–51 and accompanying text.
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The purpose of this Article is to provide a rational approach to allocating rights of cost recovery that is consistent both with the language of
CERCLA and the Supreme Court’s analysis in Cooper/Atlantic Research.
The Article begins with a discussion of the structure of CERCLA and the
tools available to the government and private parties. Part II discusses the
history of the private causes of action under CERCLA and the rationale
and implications of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Cooper and Atlantic
Research. It identifies a “taxonomy” of various situations that arise in which
there is still uncertainty regarding the applicable cause of action. These
include situations where costs are directly incurred under: (1) a CERCLA
Unilateral Administrative Order; (2) a government settlement agreement
that satisfies the requirements of 113(f)(3)(B); (3) a government settlement
agreement that does not satisfy 113(f)(3)(B); (4) a private settlement following a CERCLA civil action; and (5) a private settlement without a
CERCLA civil action.
Part III discusses the issue of “exclusivity”: are the causes of action in
107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) mutually exclusive or may a plaintiff choose between them? The section evaluates the unsatisfying rationales asserted by
courts of appeals to determine that the causes of action are exclusive. It
provides a rational and simple textual approach to resolving this issue.
Quite simply, in the event of textual overlap, standard canons of construction and the express text of section 113(f)(3)(B), not discussed by any of the
courts of appeals, suggest that 113(f) provides the exclusive cause of action
for cost recovery under CERCLA.
Part IV addresses the various situations that arise within the CERCLA
taxonomy and evaluates whether the costs incurred in these situations fall
within the scope of 107(a)(4)(B) or 113(f). Both the specific text and the
Supreme Court’s approach, particularly its focus on the “traditional” meaning of contribution, can help resolve these issues. The result of this analysis
is a straightforward application of the statute that results in a consistent and
coherent structure to CERCLA that both provides incentives for cleanup
and helps ensure that the polluter pays.

I. OVERVIEW

OF

CERCLA

A. History of CERCLA
The seventies was the environmental decade. From 1970 to 1976, Congress adopted far-reaching regulatory statutes that addressed problems of
air pollution, water pollution, and hazardous waste.13 One piece remained
13.
See, e.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2013)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act
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missing, however; the newly adopted environmental statutes did not provide effective federal mechanisms to ensure that contaminated property was
cleaned up. A series of notorious examples of contaminated sites—from
Love Canal to the “Valley of the Drums”—increased political pressure to
adopt effective federal legislation.14
In the late seventies, several versions of a federal cleanup statute were
being considered in the 96th Congress, but fate and Ronald Reagan intervened. In November 1980, Reagan was elected president and the Republicans took the Senate. The Democrats, who at that point controlled the
Presidency and both houses of Congress, had weeks to adopt legislation
before the new President and Congress took office in January 1981.15
The result was a rush to legislation. Through a complex process, CERCLA was enacted as a Senate amendment to a House Resolution, under a
suspension of the rules that precluded amendments.16 The legislative history, such as it is, consists of sometimes contradictory floor debates and the
Senate and House reports on predecessor bills which had not been
adopted.17 This history, in part, accounts for the universal recognition that
CERCLA is a poorly drafted and confusing statute with limited reliable
history to guide its implementation and interpretation.18
Major amendments to CERCLA were enacted in 1986.19 The
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act (SARA) adopted a variety
of changes and clarifications to the law including, among others, new govAmendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251–1387 (2013)); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2013)).
14.
See John C. Nagle, CERCLA’s Mistakes, 38 WM . & MARY L. REV. 1405, 1407 (1997);
Cartwright, supra note 3, at 301.
15.
See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability (“Superfund”) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL . L. 1, 1 (1982).
16.
To expedite enactment of the legislation, the Senate took an existing House Resolution, replaced its language with a Senate version drawn from earlier proposed Senate legislation, and passed the resulting version as the House Resolution. See id.; see also CAROLE STERN
SWITZER & LYNN A. BULAN, CERCLA: COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND L IABILITY ACT (SUPERFUND) (BASIC PRACTICE SERIES) 7 (1st ed. 2002).
17.
In Ninth Ave. Remedial Grp. v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ind. 1996),
the court described CERLCA’s legislative history, stating, “[T]he bill was enacted without a
conference report. Because of the lack of a conference report, the reports on the prior bills
presented during that session of Congress, S. 1480 and H.R. 7020, and the debate on those
bills, as well as the brief debate on the final bill, constituted the core of the legislative history
of CERCLA.” Id. at 660–61.
18.
See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989); Dedham
Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir. 1986).
19.
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2013)).

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA103.txt

Fall 2015]

unknown

Seq: 7

Private Causes of Action Under CERCLA

23-DEC-15

11:20

123

ernment settlement authority, clarification of cleanup standards, and, as discussed below, a new set of private causes of action.20

B. Federal Options Under CERCLA
Central to CERCLA is the extraordinary power given to the federal
government to address property contaminated with “hazardous substances.”21 First, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the
power directly to undertake the cleanup of contaminated property.22 To
ensure that the government would have the resources to act, the statute
created a separate pot of money, the federal Hazardous Substances Trust
Fund, a.k.a. “Superfund,” to be used for government cleanups.23 CERCLA
also gives the government a cause of action under section 107(a)(4)(A) to
recover its “response costs” from a group of “potentially responsible parties”
(PRPs).24 The group of PRPs is large and includes (1) the current owners or
20.
See, e.g., id. §§ 121–22, 310 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f),
9621–22); see generally U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), SUPERFUND, http://www2.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-amendments-andreauthorization-act-sara (last updated Sept. 30, 2015).
21.
Both cost recovery under section 107(a) and the issuance of orders under section
106 are limited to situations in which there has been a release or threat of release of a
“hazardous substance.” See CERCLA §§ 106(a), 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9607(a)(4)
(2013). The term “hazardous substance” is defined, in part, by cross-reference to hazardous
and toxic materials identified under other environmental statutes. CERCLA § 101(14), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(14) (cross referencing hazardous air pollutants under the Clean Air Act, toxic
pollutants under the Clean Water Act, most hazardous wastes under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and certain imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture
under the Toxic Substances Control Act). EPA has promulgated the list of hazardous substances. 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2015).
22.
CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a). Although CERCLA generally authorizes
action by “the President,” presidential authority to implement provisions of CERCLA has
generally been delegated to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. See
Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,308, 68
Fed. Reg. 37,691 (2003); Exec. Order No. 13,016, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,871 (1996), amended by
Exec. Order No. 13,308, 68 Fed. Reg. 37,691 (2003).
23.
26 U.S.C. § 9507 (2014) (establishing “a trust fund to be known as the ‘Hazardous
Substance Superfund’ ”). Congressional reauthorization of funding for the Trust Fund has a
complex history. See DAVID M. BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41039, COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT: A SUMMARY OF SUPERFUND
CLEANUP AUTHORITIES AND RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE ACT 21–23 (2012), https://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R41039.pdf.
24.
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). CERCLA distinguishes between what are generally short-term “removal” actions and long-term “remedial” actions. See
CERCLA § 101(23)–(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)–(24) (defining “remove,” “removal,” “remedy,” and “remedial action”). Removal actions are designed to address situations requiring
immediate action, while remedial actions are designed to permanently address contamination
at a site. Id. The response costs recoverable under section 107(a)(4)(A) include costs associ-
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operators of contaminated sites, (2) past owners or operators of the site at
the time of disposal, (3) persons who “arranged for disposal” of hazardous
substances at the site, and (4) transporters who were involved in selection of
the site for disposal.25 Critically, courts have held that these PRPs are
“jointly and severally” liable.26 Thus, CERCLA allows the government to
recoup all of its costs from a subset of the larger group of PRPs.
Second, the government has the power to compel private parties to
undertake the cleanup themselves. Section 106(a) contains two distinct options for the government to compel parties to clean up a site.27 First, the
government may seek a judicial order in which the court grants the requested relief.28 Alternatively, EPA may issue an administrative order to
compel action “as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and
the environment.”29 These administrative orders are referred to as “Unilateral Administrative Orders” (UAOs),30 and, given the magnitude of penalties for non-compliance, UAOs are potent tools to compel the cleanup of
sites.31
Despite the government’s extraordinary unilateral powers, much of the
federal CERCLA process involves settlement. It is common for EPA to
undertake preliminary investigation at a site and then threaten PRPs with
cost recovery and UAOs.32 The result is a settlement, either in the form of a
judicial consent decree or an “Administrative Settlement Agreement and
Order on Consent” (ASAOC).33 Typically, these settlements involve a
ated with performing both removal and remedial actions. See CERCLA § 101(25), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(25) (defining “respond” and “response” to include both “removal” and “remedial” actions and any other related enforcement action).
25.
CERCLA § 107(a)(1)–(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4).
26.
See infra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.
27.
CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
30.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Superfund Cleanup Subject Listing Orders - Unilateral, ENFORCEMENT, http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/index.cfm
?action=3&sub_id=1230 (last updated Sept. 30, 2015).
31.
Persons who, without “sufficient cause,” fail to comply with an administrative order
are potentially subject to both a $25,000 per-day fine and a penalty of up to three times the
amount of the final cleanup. CERCLA §§ 106(b)(1), 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b)(1),
9607(c)(3).
32.
See e.g., CERCLA § 122(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e) (providing “special notice” procedures designed to facilitate negotiation of settlements); OFFICE OF SITE REMEDIATION ENF’T,
U.S. ENVTL . PROT. AGENCY, CERCLA ENFORCEMENT PROJECT MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK (1999)
[hereinafter EPA HANDBOOK] (outlining EPA’s practices and policies when enforcing
CERCLA).
33.
See EPA HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at ch. 5. These agreements were previously
referred to as “Administrative Orders on Consent” or AOCs. EPA revised the terminology
in 2005 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Ser-

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA103.txt

Fall 2015]

unknown

Seq: 9

Private Causes of Action Under CERCLA

23-DEC-15

11:20

125

group of PRPs who agree to reimburse the government for the government’s costs and commit to undertake additional cleanup actions.
In the SARA amendments, Congress created special authorization and
incentives to foster the use of settlements to resolve CERCLA disputes.34
Section 122 contains distinct authority to enter settlements in which the
settling parties agree to undertake cleanup actions at a site35 and/or reimburse government costs.36 It also provides procedures for approval of
settlements.37
vices, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004). The revisions were an attempt to assure PRPs that settlements would provide contribution protection and authorize a right of contribution under 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B). See Memorandum from Susan Bromm, Dir., Office of Site
Remediation Enf’t, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, on Interim Revisions to CERCLA Removal,
RI/FS and RD AOC Models to Clarify Contribution Rights and Protection Under Section
113(f) (Aug. 3, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 EPA Revised Settlement Memo], http://www2.epa
.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/interim-rev-aoc-mod-mem.pdf.
EPA has since issued a series of revisions to its model administrative settlements and
consent decrees. See, e.g., Memorandum from Marcia Mulkey, Dir., Office of Site Remediation Enf’t, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, on Interim Revisions to CERCLA Judicial and Administrative Settlement Models to Clarify Contribution Rights and Protection from Claims
Following the Aviall and Atlantic Research Corporation Decisions (Mar. 16, 2009) [hereinafter
2009 EPA Revised Settlement Memo], http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/interim-settle-arc-mem_0.pdf; Cindy Mackey, Dir., Office of Site Remediation Enf’t,
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, on Revisions to 2009 ARC Memo and Issuance of Revised CERCLA Past Cost, Peripheral, De Minimis, De Micromis, and Municipal Solid Waste Settlement Models (Sept. 26, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 EPA Revised Settlement Memo], http://
www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-09/documents/payment-models-2014-mem.pdf.
Many of the changes have been in response to case law defining the elements required
to constitute an approved section 113(f)(3)(B) settlement. See infra notes 201–22 and accompanying text.
34.
CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622; see also Timothy B. Atkeson et al., An Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),
16 ENVTL . L. REP . 10,360, 10,410–12 (1986). The settlement incentives in SARA include
contribution protection, see infra notes 53–54 and accompanying text, and government “covenants not to sue,” see CERCLA § 122(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f).
35.
CERCLA § 122(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (authorizing the government to enter into
an “agreement” with a person to perform any response action).
36.
CERCLA § 122(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(h) (authorizing the government to settle a
section 107 cost recovery claim for “costs incurred by the United States Government”).
37.
Settlements requiring settling parties to undertake long-term “remedial” actions
must be judicially approved and embodied in a consent decree. CERCLA §§ 122(d)(1)(A),
42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A). Other settlements involving parties who contribute relatively
small amounts at a site (de minimis parties), CERCLA § 122(g), 122(d)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9622(g), 9622(d)(1)(A), or settlements involving preliminary actions at a site may be
implemented through administrative settlements. Settlements that involve resolution of government financial claims must be published in the Federal Register for public comment.
CERCLA § 122(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(i).
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C. The Private Causes of Action Under CERCLA
CERCLA, in its current incarnation, has three express causes of action
that allow private parties to recover their response costs. First, section
107(a)(4)(B) authorizes private parties who have directly “incurred” response costs to recover these costs from the group of PRPs.38 This section
thus provides an incentive for voluntary cleanup by providing any person,
including a PRP, with a mechanism to recover all or part of its cleanup costs
from others.39 Second, section 113(f)(1) provides that “[a]ny person may
seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable
under section 9607 (a) [107(a)] of this title, during or following any civil
action under section 9606 [106] of this title or under section 9607 (a) [107(a)] of this title.”40 At a minimum, this allows PRPs who
have been held liable in a cost recovery action under section 107(a) to seek
“contribution” from other PRPs for costs imposed in the civil action.41
Third, section 113(f)(3)(B) provides:
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a
State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the
costs of such action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek contribution from any person who is not party to
a settlement referred to in paragraph (2).42
These two “contribution” causes of action under 113(f) provide an express
method for allocating cleanup costs among PRPs.43
38.
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). Section 107(a)(4)(B) provides that, in addition to government response costs, PRPs shall be liable for “any other
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan.” Id. Although the language does not expressly create a cause of action, in Key
Tronic v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that, despite its odd phrasing “§ 107 unquestionably provides a cause of action for private parties to seek recovery of cleanup costs.”
511 U.S. 809, 818 (1994).
39.
See H.R. REP . NO. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 17, 29 (1980) (“The legislation would also
establish a Federal cause of action in strict liability to enable the [EPA] Administrator to
pursue rapid recovery of the costs incurred for the costs of such [cleanup] actions undertaken
by him from persons liable therefore and to induce such persons voluntarily to pursue appropriate environmental response actions with respect to inactive hazardous waste sites.”) (emphasis added); see also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bush, 918 F.2d 1323, 1326 (7th Cir. 1990)
(describing Congress’s “manifest legislative intent to encourage voluntary private cleanup
action”).
40.
CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
41.
See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 138–39 (2007).
42.
CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B).
43.
See infra notes 48–50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standard for
allocation of costs in contribution actions under CERCLA.
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D. CERCLA Provisions Affected by the Private Cause of Action
CERCLA is a complex statute with a variety of closely interrelated
provisions, and, unfortunately, Congress does not appear to have crafted the
private causes of action with an understanding of either these interrelations
or the implications of the statutory language. Sadly, to understand the rationale and consequences of courts’ interpretation of the relationship between sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f), it is necessary to consider the
following mind-numbing components of CERCLA.44
Cost Allocation and the Standard of Liability. CERCLA does not contain
an express standard of liability for cost recovery under 107(a)(4)(B). Relying on legislative history, however, courts have universally held that liability
under 107(a) is “joint and several.”45 Citing Restatement principles, courts,
including the Supreme Court, have held that liability under section 107 is
joint and several unless there is a discrete harm that provides a basis for
allocating costs to parties.46 This possibility of division based on harm is
more theoretical than real. For a variety of reasons, most courts have found
that liability under 107 is “joint and several” among PRPs.47 This has led to
a general acceptance of the proposition that a PRP suing under section
107(a)(4)(B) is entitled to recover one hundred percent of its costs unless a
defendant can bring a counterclaim for contribution.
In contrast to section 107(a), the contribution provisions of section
113(f) are governed by an express statutory standard of “equitable allocation.” Section 113(f)(1) states that: “In resolving contribution claims, the
court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable
factors as the court determines are appropriate.”48 This equitable allocation
is conceptually different from “several” liability potentially available under
107;49 equitable allocation under 113(f) allows the court to consider “appropriate factors,” other than the divisibility of harm, which may include differ44.
As one court noted: “[W]ading through CERCLA’s morass of statutory provisions
can often seem as daunting as cleaning up one of the sites the statute is designed to cover.”
Cadlerock Props. Joint Venture v. Schilberg, No. 3:01CV896(MRK), 2005 WL 1683494, at
*5 (D. Conn. July 19, 2005).
45.
See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613–14
(2009) (discussing case law establishing joint and several liability under section
107(a)(4)(B)).
46.
Id. at 613.
47.
See JENNIFER L. MACHLIN & TOMME R. YOUNG, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK: REAL
ESTATE AND BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 4A:57 (West ed. 2014); Derek Wetmore, Joint and Several
Liability After Burlington Northern: Alive and Well, 32 VA. ENVTL . L.J. 27, 59 (2014).
48.
CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2013).
49.
See Yankee Gas Serv. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 229, 241–42 (D.
Conn. 2012) (discussing conceptual differences between cost apportionment under “joint and
several” principles and cost allocation under section 113(f)(1)).
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ences in volume and toxicity, or the conduct, cooperation, and culpability of
parties.50
Statute of Limitations. CERCLA contains several statutes of limitation
applicable to cost recovery actions. Section 113(g)(2), entitled “Actions for
Recovery of Costs,” provides up to six years from the initiation of certain
cleanup activity.51 This statute of limitations, applicable to claims under
107(a), is linked to the timing of physical activity in cleaning up property.
Section 113(g)(3), entitled “Contribution,” provides a three-year statute of
limitations starting from the date of a judgment or certain administrative
settlements.52 Thus, in contrast to actions under 107(a)(4)(B), the statute of
limitations for contribution under 113(f) is linked to the date of judicial or
administrative actions rather than the date in which the cleanup costs are
incurred.
Contribution Protection. Settlements typically involve a limited number
of PRPs, and following settlement there may be a group of non-settling
parties who remain liable for cleanup costs. As an incentive to settle, CERCLA protects settling parties from subsequent actions for contribution by
these non-settling parties.53 As discussed below, the Supreme Court has
50.
Although not enacted, many courts have referred to a list of equitable allocation
factors, proposed by then Senator Al Gore, that include, among others, the contribution of
each party, the amount and toxicity of the hazardous substances, the degree of care, and the
cooperation with the government demonstrated by the party. See, e.g., United States v.
Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hardage, 116
F.R.D. 460, 466 (W.D. Okla. 1987); Steven Ferrey, Allocation and Uncertainty in the Age of
Superfund: A Critique of the Redistribution of CERCLA Liability, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL . L.J. 36, 60
(1994).
51.
Section 113(g)(2) provides that “an initial action for recovery of costs referred to in
section 107” must be commenced A) within 3 years after completion of certain short term
cleanups referred to as “removal actions” or B) within 6 years of initiation of certain long
term cleanups, referred to as “remedial actions.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2).
52.
Section 113(g)(3) provides that
[n]o action for contribution may be commenced more than 3 years after:
(A) the date of judgment in any action under this chapter for recovery of such
costs or damages, or
(B) the date of an administrative order under section 9622 (g) of this title (relating to de minimis settlements) or 9622(h) of this title (relating to cost recovery
settlements) or entry of a judicially approved settlement with respect to such costs
or damages.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2).
53.
Section 113(f)(2) specifically provides that “a person who has resolved its liability
to the United States or a State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall
not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.” 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
Section 122 also contains provisions specifically authorizing inclusion of “contribution
protection” provisions in EPA settlements. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(h)(4), 9622(g)(5).
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held that this contribution protection bars only contribution actions under
113(f) and not cost recovery actions under 107(a)(4)(B).54
Declaratory Judgments. The statute of limitations provisions in 113(g)(2)
applicable to section 107(a) cost recovery actions contain another relevant
component. Section 113(g)(2) expressly provides that a court in a section
107 cost recovery action may issue a “declaratory judgment on liability for
response costs or damages that will be binding on any subsequent action or
actions to recover further response costs or damages.”55 No comparable provision providing for a declaratory judgment applies to actions for
contribution.56
Priority of Government Claims. The federal government has a unique
concern about the consequence of the private cause of action on the priority
of government claims. Section 113(f)(3)(B) provides an express right of
contribution for parties who have resolved their liability to the government
through an approved agreement. Section 113(f)(3)(C) provides: “In an action under this paragraph [113(f)(3)], the rights of any person who has resolved its liability to the United States or the State shall be subordinate to
the rights of the United States or the State.”57 No comparable provision
provides for the priority of government claims in actions brought under
section 107(a)(4)(B) or 113(f)(1).58

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE CAUSES

OF

ACTION

The existence and scope of CERCLA’s private causes of action developed over time through the interplay between poorly drafted statutory provisions and judicial attempts to make sense of CERCLA’s language and
structure. This history can be divided into three phases: (1) the period from
the adoption of CERCLA in 1980 to the adoption of the SARA amendments in 1986; (2) the period from the SARA amendments to the Supreme
Court cases of Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. and United States
v. Atlantic Research Corp.; and (3) the current post-Cooper/Atlantic Research
period, in which federal courts are struggling to clarify the issues left unresolved by Cooper and Atlantic Research.
54.
See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
55.
CERCLA § 113(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2).
56.
See infra note 226.
57.
CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(C).
58.
This, among other reasons, gives the government a particular interest in advocating
that section 113(f)(3)(B) provides an exclusive cause of action. See, e.g., Brief of the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 10-14, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3843). This might also caution
taking the government’s position on the relationship between sections 107(a)(4)(B) and
113(f)(3)(B) with a grain of salt.
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A. CERCLA to SARA
When adopted in 1980, CERCLA contained the ambiguously phrased
107(a)(4)(B), which provides that, under certain circumstances, PRPs “shall
be liable” to “other persons.”59 Whether this created a federal cause of action
was the subject of dispute.60 In the early 1980’s, however, courts universally
held that 107(a)(4)(B) did create a cause of action for PRPs to recover response costs from other PRPs, even where the government had not supervised or approved the cleanup.61 This initial identification of a private right
of cost recovery under 107(a)(4)(B) created problems. How could PRPs
who had reimbursed the government in a government cost recovery action
under 107(a)(4)(A) sue other PRPs to recover a share of the costs they had
paid? How could a court in a cost recovery action brought by a PRP under
107(a)(4)(B) allocate costs among plaintiff and defendant PRPs?
The creative answer found by most courts was an “implied” right of
contribution either under 107 or federal common law.62 Through this implied right of contribution, PRPs who had been subject to a cost recovery
action could sue for contribution from other PRPs to recover some of their
costs, and, presumably, PRPs sued by other PRPs under 107(a)(4)(B) could,
during that action, file a counterclaim for contribution to allocate costs.
This made sense. PRPs had been said to have “joint and several” liability
based on “traditional and evolving principles of common law,” and courts
59.
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
60.
See supra note 38. Other provisions, sections 111 and 112, suggested a different cost
recovery mechanism under which PRPs could recover cleanup costs from Superfund. In the
early years of CERCLA, much of the litigation focused on the relationship between section
107 and the other mechanisms of sections 111–12. See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Recovering Hazardous
Waste Cleanup Costs: The Private Cause of Action under CERCLA, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 181 (1986).
61.
See, e.g., Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568,
1572–74 (5th Cir. 1988); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 891–92 (9th
Cir. 1986); Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317–19 (6th Cir. 1985); Philadelphia v.
Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142–43 (E.D. Pa. 1982), superseded by statute, SARA,
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, as recognized in E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v.
United States, 460 F.3d 515, 520 (3d Cir. 2006), and abrogated by United States v. Atl.
Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007).
62.
See, e.g., United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1265–68 (D. Del.
1986), superseded by statute, SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, as recognized in E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 520 (3d Cir. 2006), and abrogated by United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007); Colorado v. Asarco, Inc.,
608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486–90 (D. Colo. 1985), superseded by statute, SARA, Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613, as recognized in E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460
F.3d 515, 520 (3d Cir. 2006), and abrogated by United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S.
128 (2007); see also Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo.
1985).
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relied on common law rights of contribution among joint tortfeasors to justify an implied right of contribution among PRPs.63
The development of an “implied” right of contribution under 107 was,
however, curtailed by two Supreme Court cases in the early 1980s that
placed substantial limits on the development of such an “implied” federal
cause of action for contribution.64 It appeared that the implied right of
contribution under CERCLA was in danger of being rejected in light of
this new case law.

B. SARA to Cooper/Atlantic Research
Congress responded to this threat by adding, in the 1986 SARA amendments, the express rights of contribution in section 113(f).65 Following
SARA, CERCLA thus contained both the original right of cost recovery
under 107(a)(4)(B) and the two express rights of contribution in sections
113(f)(1) and 113(f)(3)(B). The language of SARA, however, created confusion about the applicability of the sections.66 Particularly problematic was
the language in section 113(f)(1), which created a right of contribution “during or following a civil action.”67 A voluntary cleanup did not arise “during
or following a civil action,” but allowing such an action to proceed under
107(a)(4)(B) created a number of problems relating to the application of
“joint and several” liability, the statute of limitations, and contribution
protection.68
63.
New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. at 1266.
64.
The two cases that had undermined the basis for finding a federal implied statutory
or common law right of contribution under CERCLA were Texas Industries Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (rejecting an implied statutory or common law right
contribution under the Sherman Act or Clayton Act) and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (rejecting implied statutory or common law right of contribution
under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
65.
Congress specifically acknowledged that section 113(f) was intended to “clarify and
confirm” the existence of a right of contribution. See S. REP . NO. 99-11, at 44 (1985). SARA
also contained the new statutes of limitation applicable to cost recovery and contribution
claims, see supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text, the provisions providing for “contribution protection,” see supra note 53 and accompanying text, and other provisions relating to
settlement agreements, see supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
66.
In Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, the Court characterized the situation, stating:
“[T]he statute now expressly authorizes a cause of action for contribution in § 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping remedy in § 107.” 511 U.S. 809, 816
(1994).
67.
CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2013).
68.
See, e.g., Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344 (6th
Cir. 1998), abrogated by Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757 (6th Cir.
2014); Sun Co. Inc. (R&M) v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1997); see also
Jeffrey M. Gaba, United States v. Atlantic Research: The Supreme Court Almost Gets it Right”,
37 ENVT. L. REP . 10,810, 10,811–10,812 (2007).
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Following SARA, courts of appeals, without exception, resolved the
confusion by holding that any PRP seeking cost recovery from other PRPs
must sue for contribution under 113(f).69 Two basic rationales were used by
courts of appeals to justify this conclusion. First, cost recovery among
jointly liable PRPs involved a “quintessential claim for contribution” since
they involved cost allocation among a class of “joint tortfeasors.”70 Second,
exclusive allocation of PRPs to 113(f) contribution claims protected important structural components of CERCLA, including contribution protection.71 Although courts struggled to address the statute of limitations
problems that this approach created,72 all seemed well and CERCLA appeared coherent: non-PRPs could only sue under 107(a)(4)(B) and PRPs
could only sue for contribution under 113(f).

C. The Supreme Court’s Resolution: Cooper and
Atlantic Research
1. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.
This apparent coherence proved to be temporary. The house of cards
started falling following a U.S. district court opinion in Aviall Services, Inc.
v. Cooper Industries, Inc.73 The case involved a typical CERCLA action: the
current owner of contaminated property, Aviall Services, had “voluntarily”
cleaned up its property and was seeking “contribution” under section
113(f)(1) from the former owner, Cooper Industries.74 Consistent with the
array of then-existing court of appeals decisions, the plaintiff had based its
69.
See Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 1998), abrogated by W.R.
Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2009); Centerior, 153 F.3d
344; Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769
(4th Cir. 1998); Pinal Creek Grp. v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997),
abrogated by City of Colton v. Am. Promotional Events, Inc.-W., 390 F. App’x 749 (9th Cir.
2010); New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1997); United
States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995); United Tech. Corp. v.
Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30
F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
70.
See, e.g., Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 423–24; Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d at
1536; Akzo, 30 F.3d at 764.
71.
See, e.g., United Tech., 33 F.3d at 99–100; see also United States v. New Castle
County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1269 (D. Del. 1986), superseded by statute, SARA, Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, as recognized in E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. United States,
460 F.3d 515, 520 (3d Cir. 2006), and abrogated by United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551
U.S. 128 (2007).
72.
See, e.g., Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1997).
73.
See Aviall Serv., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 2000 WL 31730 (N.D. Tex. 2000),
aff’d, 263 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2001), rev’d en banc, 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d and
remanded, 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
74.
Id. at *1.
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claim for cost recovery on 113(f)(1).75 The district court, however, dismissed
Aviall’s 113(f)(1) claim because it did not arise “during or following” a civil
action.76 A panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed this result.77 However, following rehearing en banc, the full Fifth Circuit reversed and held that a cost
recovery action brought by one PRP against another was an action for contribution that should be brought under 113(f)(1).78 In this, the Fifth Circuit
joined other courts of appeals that had considered the issue.79
Despite the absence of a split among the circuits, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine if a PRP could sue under 113(f)(1) in the
absence of a prior or pending civil action. In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall
Services, Inc.,80 all nine members of the Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice Thomas, agreed that a PRP who had not previously been subject to a
civil action could not sue under 113(f)(1).81 The Court relied on three rationales in reaching this conclusion. First, this was the “natural meaning” of
the language of the statute: parties may, and thus may only, bring an action
under 113(f)(1) “during or following” a civil action.82 Second, allowing an
action for contribution in the absence of a civil action would render “part of
the statute entirely superfluous.”83 If parties could sue at any time, the
phrase “during or following a civil action” would become meaningless.84 Finally, the Court noted that the language of section 113(g)(3)(A) supported
its interpretation; the statute of limitations for an action for contribution
was triggered by a “judgment,” something that would not exist if a party
could sue for contribution without an underlying civil action.85 The Court
expressly eschewed reliance on arguments suggesting an interpretation that
supported the “purpose” of CERCLA.86 In the Court’s view the issue was
75.
Id.
76.
Id. at *4.
77.
Aviall Serv., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2001), rev’d en
banc, 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d and remanded, 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
78.
Aviall Serv., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d and
remanded, 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
79.
See id. at 688 n.21 (citing numerous cases from courts of appeals allowing contribution actions under section 113(f)(1) in the absence of a prior or pending civil action).
80.
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
81.
Id. at 171. But see id. at 171 (Ginsburg and Stevens, J.J., dissenting) (concluding that
PRPs could proceed in an action under section 107(a)(4)(B)).
82.
Id. at 166 (majority opinion).
83.
Id.
84.
Id. In the Court’s view, finding that a PRP could bring an action for contribution at
any time would render a specific phrase in CERCLA totally devoid of content. See infra
notes 135–37, 172–74 and accompanying text for an explanation of the role of “superfluity” in
interpreting the relationship between sections 107(a) and 113(f).
85.
Cooper, 543 U.S. at 167.
86.
Id. at 167–68.
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simple: “Section 113(f)(1) authorizes contribution claims only ‘during or
following’ a civil action under § 106 or § 107(a), and it is undisputed that
Aviall has never been subject to such an action. Aviall therefore has no
§ 113(f)(1) claim.”87
The Court, however, left several issues unresolved. Since Aviall had not
been subject to an EPA Unilateral Administrative Order, the Court declined to consider whether such an order was a “civil action” for purposes of
113(f)(1).88 Additionally, the Court expressly declined to address the issue
of whether an “implied right of contribution” existed independent of
113(f).89
Most significantly, the Supreme Court left open the question of
whether a PRP who had not previously been subject to a civil action could
sue under 107(a)(4)(B).90 The issue was critical. Pre-Cooper cases had said
that PRPs could not sue under 107(a)(4)(B); they could sue only under
113(f).91 Since Cooper took away the 113(f) claim, one possible conclusion
was that, following Cooper, PRPs who voluntarily cleaned up property had
87.
Id. at 168.
88.
Id. at 168 n.5 (“Neither has Aviall been subject to an administrative order under
§ 106; thus, we need not decide whether such an order would qualify as a ‘civil action under
section 9606 . . . or under section 9607(a)’ of CERCLA.”).
89.
Id. at 170–71. Although the first sentence of 113(f)(1) provides a right of contribution “during or following” a civil action, the last sentence of 113(f)(1) states: “Nothing in this
subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the
absence of a civil action under section 9606 [106] of this title or section 9607 [107] of this
title.” CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2013).
This so-called “saving clause” has been the source of some confusion. In Cooper, the
Court stated that the sole function of the sentence was
to clarify that § 113(f)(1) does nothing to “diminish” any cause(s) of action for
contribution that may exist independently of § 113(f)(1) . . . [rebutting] any presumption that the express right of contribution provided by the enabling clause is
the exclusive contribution cause of action available to a PRP. The sentence, however, does not itself establish a cause of action; nor does it expand § 113(f)(1) to
authorize contribution actions not brought “during or following” a § 106 or
§ 107(a) civil action; nor does it specify what causes of action for contribution, if
any, exist outside § 113(f)(1).
543 U.S. at 166–67.
This raises the possibility that some “implied” right of contribution exists independent
of the statutory rights of contribution in section 113(f). The majority opinion in Cooper
expressed doubt about the existence of such an implied right, but expressly declined to
address the issue. Id. at 169. See infra notes 165–70 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the continuing existence of an implied right of contribution.
90.
Cooper, 543 U.S. at 169–70. Justices Ginsberg and Stevens, in their dissent, would
have allowed the action to proceed under section 107(a)(4)(B). Id. at 171–74 (Ginsberg and
Stevens, J.J., dissenting).
91.
Id. at 169 (citing numerous decisions of courts of appeals precluding PRPs from
suing under section 107(a)(4)(B)).
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no cause of action under CERCLA—either under 113(f) or under
107(a)(4)(B).

2. United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.
Following Cooper, a flurry of courts addressed the issue of whether
PRPs who voluntarily clean up property could sue for cost recovery under
107(a)(4)(B).92 Within three years, the issue was back to the Supreme
Court. In United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., the Supreme Court unanimously held that a PRP who had voluntarily cleaned up property in the
absence of a prior or pending civil action could sue under section
107(a)(4)(B).93 Again, the Court found the answer in the “natural reading”
and “plain language” of the text of CERCLA. Section 107(a)(4)(B) allowed
cost recovery by “any other person” who incurred response costs. The structural relationship between sections 107(a)(4)(A) (the section authorizing
cost recovery by government entities) and (a)(4)(B) (authorizing cost recovery by “any other person”), suggested that section 107(a)(4)(B) authorized
cost recovery by any person other than the government entities.94 Nothing
in the language justified a conclusion that PRPs, who were themselves
within the definition of “persons,” could not bring a 107 action.
The Court reached this conclusion in full recognition that this could
potentially upset a critical structural component of CERCLA. Allowing a
PRP to bring a direct claim under 107(a)(4)(B), rather than a contribution
claim under 113(f)(1), meant that settling PRPs would effectively lose contribution protection. In other words, a PRP who settled with the government could now be subject to a 107(a)(4)(B) cost recovery action from nonsettling PRPs for costs addressed in the settlement, and a major incentive
for settlement was potentially threatened. Acknowledging the loss of contribution protection, the Court minimized the implications. According to the
Court, the contribution bar still provided “significant protection” in certain
circumstances.95 Further, if a settling PRP was sued under 107, the settling
92.
See, e.g., Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc.,
473 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2007); E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d
515 (3d Cir. 2006), vacated, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 551 U.S. 1129
(2007); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005).
93.
United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007).
94.
The Court wrote:
In light of the relationship between the subparagraphs, it is natural to read the
phrase “any other person” by referring to the immediately preceding subparagraph
(A), which permits suit only by the United States, a State, or an Indian tribe. The
phrase “any other person” therefore means any person other than those three.
Id. at 135.
95.
Although non-settling PRPs could sue under section 107(a)(4)(B), in the Court’s
view, the contribution protection still “continues to provide significant protection from con-
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PRP could counterclaim under 113(f) for contribution since this was “during” a civil action.96 Through the counterclaim the court could allocate
costs, and, according to the Court, the court hearing the claims would undoubtedly take into account the amounts previously paid by the defendant
in the settlement.97
Critically, the unanimous opinion addressed the relationship between
sections 107 and 113. According to the Court, the availability of an action
under 107(a)(4)(B) did not mean that PRPs had the choice of proceeding
under either 107(a) or 113(f).98 The court expressly stated that, in the context of PRPs who voluntarily clean up property, 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f)
simply did not overlap: a PRP who voluntarily cleans up property could
only sue under 107; a PRP who pays money following a civil action or an
approved settlement can only sue under 113(f)(1).99 In the Court’s words,
“[t]he choice of remedies simply does not exist.”100
The Court relied on two bits of statutory language to reach this conclusion. First, the Court relied on the meaning of the word “contribution.”
Citing Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court stated that contribution refers to a
“tortfeasor’s right to collect from others responsible for the same tort after
the tortfeasor has paid more than his or her proportionate share, the shares
being determined as a percentage of fault.”101 The Court further stated “a
PRP’s right to contribution under § 113(f)(1) is contingent upon an inequitable distribution of common liability among liable parties.”102 In the context of 113(f)(1), the court observed that this “common liability” stemmed
“from an action instituted under § 106 or § 107(a).”103
Second, the Court stated that PRPs who reimburse other parties do not
“incur” cleanup costs.104 According to the Court, “[w]hen a party pays to
satisfy a settlement agreement or a court judgment, it does not incur its own
costs of response. Rather, it reimburses other parties for costs that those
parties incurred,”105 and parties who were reimbursing costs incurred by
other parties did not satisfy the statutory prerequisite of imposing liability
tribution suits by PRPs that have inequitably reimbursed the costs incurred by another
party.” Id. at 141.
96.
Id. at 140.
97.
Id. at 140–41.
98.
Id. at 139–40.
99.
Id.
100.
Id. at 140.
101.
Id. at 138 (citing Contribution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
102.
Id. at 139.
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
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under 107(a)(4)(B).106 Thus, as a matter of statutory construction, private
causes of action under sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f)(1) are mutually exclusive, arising under distinct “procedural circumstances.”107
The Court, however, recognized the possibility that in other circumstances sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) might overlap. The Court noted
that a PRP may directly “sustain expenses” pursuant to a consent decree
“following a suit under § 106 or § 107,” and “[i]n such a case, the PRP does
not incur costs voluntarily but does not reimburse the costs of another
party.”108 The Court stated: “We do not decide whether these compelled
costs of response are recoverable under § 113(f), § 107(a), or both.”109 The
Court went on to say: “For our purposes, it suffices to demonstrate that
costs incurred voluntarily are recoverable only by way of § 107(a)(4)(B),
and costs of reimbursement to another person pursuant to a legal judgment
or settlement are recoverable only under § 113(f).”110 In the Court’s words,
“neither remedy swallows the other.”111

3. Lessons from Cooper and Atlantic Research
Cooper and Atlantic Research clearly set boundaries to sections
107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f)(1): costs incurred undertaking a voluntary cleanup
are exclusively recoverable under 107(a)(4)(B); costs that are reimbursed
following a “civil action” or certain approved “settlements” are exclusively
recoverable under 113(f)(1). In addition to these specific holdings, however,
it is also important to understand the process the Court used to reach these
results. Understanding the “lessons” of Cooper and Atlantic Research provides
guidance on how to address the unresolved issues of the relationship among
CERCLA’s private causes of action.
Reliance on the Plain Reading of the Text. Perhaps the most surprising
element of the Cooper and Atlantic Research decisions was the Court’s almost
exclusive reliance on the plain language of CERCLA to resolve the complex
relationship among the sections. In Cooper, the plain language of “during or
following” guided its decision about the appropriate role for section
113(f)(1).112 A reference to language in the statute of limitations provision
106.
Id.
107.
Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 99 (2d
Cir. 2005)).
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112.
See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004); supra notes
80–84 and accompanying text.
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of CERCLA was used only to bolster the Court’s interpretation of the “during or following” language.113
Similarly, in Atlantic Research, the availability to PRPs of a right of cost
recovery under 107(a)(4)(B) was clear from the express language of the section: 107(a)(4)(B) allows cost recovery by “any other person.” Contrasting
the phrase with the language of section 107(a)(4)(A), the Court concluded
that the language clearly allowed a right of cost recovery by “any” person
other than the government entities specified in 107(a)(4)(A).114 Nothing
fancy; the words mean what they mean.
The Court was also guided by the words “incur” and “contribution” to
determine the relationship between 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f).115 In the
Court’s view, parties who reimburse others for cleanup costs do not “incur”
response costs and thus have no right of cost recovery under 107(a)(4)(B).
Common law “contribution” includes parties who reimburse other parties
for a share of a common liability. The specific words define the allocation.
Rejection of Structural or Policy Arguments. Another striking aspect of the
opinions in Cooper and Atlantic Research is the extent to which the Court was
unconcerned with interpreting the sections to foster the goals of CERCLA.
In other words, the Court did not interpret the sections to promote some
desired end or coherent structure to CERCLA. This is apparent from a
number of aspects of the decisions. Perhaps most telling is the Supreme
Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Cooper in the first place. When the
Court considered Cooper, there was a coherent and consistent approach to
the relationship between 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f)—PRPs suing other PRPs
for cost recovery were suing in contribution and were limited to an action
under 113(f). Indeed, there was no split among the circuits on this conclusion. Despite this coherence, the Court granted certiorari to consider the
inconsistency of this approach with the plain “during or after” language of
113(f)(1).
Further, the Court in Atlantic Research concluded that the plain language of CERCLA authorized a PRP to bring an action under 107(a)(4)(B)
notwithstanding the potentially significant impact this conclusion would
have on “contribution protection” available in CERCLA settlements.116
Language trumped coherence.
Role of “Traditional” Contribution. One of the more confusing elements
of Atlantic Research was its focus on the “traditional” meaning of contribu113.
114.
115.
116.

Supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
Supra note 94 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 101–07 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
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tion to interpret the scope of 113(f).117 A few things seem clear. The Court’s
analysis cannot mean that all costs falling within the traditional meaning of
contribution are recoverable under 113(f) even if they do not arise following
a “civil action” or judicial or administrative settlement. Whatever the status
of an “implied” right of contribution in CERCLA, it does not originate in
the text of 113(f). Nor can it mean that there is no right of contribution for
costs arising following a “civil action” or judicial or administrative settlement unless the costs also fall within the traditional meaning of contribution. This would make the express textual language of 113(f)(1) and
113(f)(3)(B) truly surplusage.
Although the Court’s analysis of “traditional” contribution does not define the class of costs recoverable under 113(f), it nonetheless has important
implications for the scope of 113(f).118 The Court’s analysis of the meaning
of contribution provides an important interpretative tool to determine the
class of costs that fall within the textual scope of 113(f).
The Court’s analysis of the “traditional” meaning of contribution in Atlantic Research is, however, quite limited. The Court simply quoted Black’s
Law Dictionary which defines contribution as a “tortfeasor’s right to collect
from others responsible for the same tort after the tortfeasor has paid more
than his or her proportionate share, the shares being determined as a percentage of fault.”119
The Court also observed that a PRP’s right to contribution under section 113(f)(1) is “contingent upon an inequitable distribution of common
liability among liable parties.”120
Although all actions by one PRP against another PRP involve persons
with a common liability, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the view
that all actions by one PRP to apportion costs with another PRP constitute
117.
Infra note 120 and accompanying text.
118.
As discussed below, there has been confusion, for example, over which costs incurred following a civil action or settlement are recoverable under section 113(f). See infra
notes 225–26, 251 and accompanying text.
119.
United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 138 (2007) (quoting Contribution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
120.
Id. at 139. The United States, in its briefs in Atlantic Research, advocated a different
characterization of “traditional” contribution. In the government’s view, traditional contribution requires that the payments for which a party seeks contribution have “extinguished” or
“resolved” some or all of a common liability. See generally Brief for the United States at
24–26, United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007) (No. 06-562). The Supreme Court in Atlantic Research did not, however, allude either to the government’s argument or to the Restatement and other authorities the Government cited in support of its
position. The Court relied solely on the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of traditional
contribution. Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 138 (citing Contribution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th
ed. 2004)).
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an action for contribution.121 Rather, the Court stated that an action under
113(f)(1) met the definition of “traditional” contribution because those costs
were recoverable “during or following” a civil action in which a “common
liability” was established.122 In contrast, the Court held that recovery of
costs under 107(a)(4)(B) did not fall within the concept of contribution
since “[a] private party may recover under 107(a) without establishment of a
liability to a third party.”123
Neither the Black’s Law Dictionary definition nor the Court’s description provides very clear guidance on the elements that distinguish cost recovery from “traditional” contribution. Certainly, an element of a cost
recovery action under 107(a) is proof that the defendant is a PRP.124 What
apparently is lacking is the requirement that the plaintiff also establish that
it is a PRP that shares a common liability with the defendant. In contrast,
in an action for recovery of costs imposed “during or following” a civil action, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant is a PRP, and the plaintiff’s
status as a jointly liable PRP will, presumably, have been established in the
predicate civil action or in the defendant’s counterclaim for contribution.125
Thus, the Court’s analysis suggests that the traditional meaning of contribution is satisfied, for purposes of CERCLA, if the process that led a party to
directly incur costs involved a determination that the party is a PRP that
shares a common liability with the defendant in any subsequent contribution action.
Rationale for Mutual Exclusivity. In Atlantic Research, the Court found
that 107(a) and 113(f)(1) provided mutually exclusive remedies in certain
contexts.126 This determination of “mutual exclusivity” was not based on the
Court’s assessment of the best way either to promote the objectives of
121.
Id. at 139. Prior to Cooper, courts of appeals had characterized any action by one
PRP to recover costs from another PRP as a “quintessential” action for contribution. See
supra note 70 and accompanying text.
122.
Id. at 138.
123.
Id. at 139.
124.
See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a) (2013); Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v.
TCI Pac. Commc’ns, No. 11–CV–0252–JED–PJC, 2013 WL 6238485, at *4 (N.D. Okla.
2013) (“Under both §§ 107 and 113, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, that the
defendant is a party that should be held responsible.”).
125.
The Court’s reference notwithstanding, this does not require proof of common
“liability to a third-party,” only that the plaintiff and defendant are jointly liable to one
another for costs of cleanup. See Cyprus, 2013 WL 6238485, at *4. Consider the situation in
Cooper, where a current landowner sued a former landowner for contamination partially
caused by each. Following Atlantic Research, the plaintiff has an action under 107(a)(4)(B)
and the defendant has a contingent counterclaim under 113(f)(1). Although both parties will
be required to establish that the other is a PRP, neither is required to establish a common
liability with any third party.
126.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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CERCLA or to integrate various interrelated sections of CERCLA. Nor
was it based on a conclusion that 113(f), adopted in SARA, in some way
superseded the direct right of cost recovery under 107 originally adopted in
CERCLA.
The reason that the Court held that the causes of action were mutually
exclusive was simple: in the circumstances addressed by the Court, they
simply did not overlap.127 Critically, the Court acknowledged the potential
that the sections might overlap in other circumstances, but nothing in
Cooper or Atlantic Research directly addresses an approach to resolving such a
situation.

4. The “Unresolved” Cause of Action Issues
After Cooper and Atlantic Research, it is clear that section 107(a)(4)(B)
exclusively applies for recovery of voluntarily incurred cleanup costs and
113(f) exclusively applies for recovery of costs reimbursed to others following a civil action or approved CERCLA settlement. The opinions, however,
left several unresolved issues regarding recovery of costs incurred in the
following important and common situations:
1) costs that are directly incurred to comply with a “unilateral administrative order”;
2) costs that are directly incurred under obligations in an “administrative or judicially approved settlement” satisfying the requirements of 113(f)(3)(B);
3) costs that are directly incurred under obligations assumed in administrative settlements that do not satisfy the requirements of
113(f)(3)(B);
4) costs that are directly incurred under judicial settlements that
do not satisfy the requirements of 113(f)(3)(B); and
5) costs that are reimbursed pursuant to a non-judicial or administrative agreement.
Two critical questions arise in determining the available causes of action in these circumstances. First, are causes of action under sections
107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) “mutually exclusive”? In other words, is a party limited to cost recovery under only one section or are multiple, alternative,
causes of action available? Second, if the causes of action are mutually exclu127.

United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139 (2006).
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sive, which statutory section applies? Since Cooper and Atlantic Research,
courts have been struggling to resolve these issues.

III. THE ISSUE

OF

“MUTUAL EXCLUSIVITY”

As discussed above, the Supreme Court expressly held that sections
107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) were mutually exclusive in certain circumstances
where they did not “overlap.”128 The Court acknowledged that there might
be situations in which they might overlap but expressly declined to address
the consequence if this occurred.129 Situations in which the causes of action
“overlap,” not addressed by the Supreme Court, raise the unresolved issue
of exclusivity: if both sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) apply, should both be
available to a party or should they be construed as mutually exclusive?

A. Current Judicial Approach to Exclusivity
Nothing in Cooper or Atlantic Research requires exclusivity. The Court
never held that in case of overlap, sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) might
not both apply. Indeed, one court, characterizing Atlantic Research, stated:
“As the Supreme Court suggested, it may well be that a party who sustains
expenses pursuant to a consent decree following a suit under [CERCLA]
may have a cause of action under either section 113(f), section 107(a), or
both.”130 Nothing in the express language or legislative history of SARA
indicates that Congress intended that 113(f) preempt or exclude application
of section 107(a).131 Nor is there anything inherently improper or unusual
about the existence of alternative causes of action with differing elements.
Nonetheless, since Atlantic Research, the seven courts of appeals that
have explicitly addressed this issue have concluded that the causes of action
under 107 and 113(f) are mutually exclusive.132 The primary focus of the
128.
See supra notes 107–11 and accompanying text.
129.
Id.
130.
W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Int’l., Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 93 n.7 (2d Cir. 2009).
131.
See Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 2012).
132.
See e.g., Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 758 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2014); NCR
Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2014); Bernstein v. Bankert,
733 F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 2013); Solutia, Inc., 672 F.3d at 1230; New York v. Solvent Chem.
Co., 664 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2011); Morrison Enters., LLC v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594 (8th
Cir. 2011); Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2010);
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2010); W.R.
Grace & Co.-Conn., 559 F.3d at 85; Kotrous v. Goss-Jewett Co. of N. Cal., 523 F.3d 924 (9th
Cir. 2008).
Two other circuits have also indicated that a claim under 113(f) precludes an action
under 107(a)(4)(B). The Fourth Circuit, in AVX Corp. v. United States, expressed “doubt” that
a party may sue under 107(a)(4)(B) for costs it directly incurred through a government
consent decree. 518 Fed. Appx. 130, 135 n.3 (4th Cir. 2013). The Fifth Circuit, in Lyondell
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courts’ analysis has been the structural consequences of non-exclusive causes
of action. Courts have been concerned that if parties could choose between
sections 107(a) and 113(f), they would invariably choose 107(a)(4)(B) since
it provides a more favorable “joint and several” standard of liability, a longer
statute of limitations, and is not subject to the “contribution protection”
bar.133 Thus, allowing plaintiffs to elect a cause of action would “undermine”
the structure of CERCLA.134
The logic employed in these cases to avoid this consequence has, however, been confused and inadequate. Each court has held that section
113(f)(3)(B) provides the exclusive remedy for at least one of the following
reasons:
Nullity or Superfluity. Most of the courts have reasoned that the remedies must be exclusive since allowing a party to proceed under either
107(a)(4)(B) or 113(f)(3)(B) would render 113(f)(3)(B) “superfluous” or a
“nullity.”135 As one court stated: “If § 9607(a) already provided the rights of
action contemplated by the SARA amendments, then the amendments were
just so many superfluous words.”136
This argument is clearly invalid on its face. Finding mutual remedies
for recovery of costs directly incurred under an approved 113(f)(3)(B) settlement would simply not render 113(f) superfluous. In Atlantic Research,
the Supreme Court held that section 113(f)(3)(B) provides a right of contribution for costs reimbursed to the government in a settlement agreement.137
Prior to the adoption of section 113(f) this right of contribution was uncertain; section 113(f)(3)(B) uniquely confirms this right. In other words, allowing mutual remedies for recovery of costs directly incurred under such a
Chemical Co. v. Occidental Chemical Corp., declined to address the District Court’s “implicit”
conclusion that plaintiffs who had incurred costs pursuant to a consent decree were limited
to an action for contribution under 113(f)(3)(B). 608 F.3d 284, 291 n.19 (5th Cir. 2010).
This is also the conclusion urged by the Department of Justice in amicus briefs on the
issue. See, e.g., United States’ Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees,
Hobart, 758 F.3d 757 (No. 13-3273); Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant, Niagara Mohawk Power, 596 F.3d 112 (No. 08-3843).
133.
See, e.g., Hobart, 758 F.3d at 767.
134.
See, e.g., Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1236; see also Morrison Enters., 638 F.3d at 603; Niagara Mohawk Power, 596 F.3d at 128.
135.
See Hobart, 758 F.3d at 767. There would be no reason to limit 113(f)’s availability
if PRPs have section 107(a)(4)(B) as a fallback option, and we generally do not interpret
congressional enactments to render certain parts of these enactments superfluous. Therefore,
it is sensible and consistent with the text to read 113(f)’s enabling language to mean that if a
party is able to bring a contribution action, it must do so under 113(f), rather than 107(a). See
Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1236; Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 205–06; Niagara Mohawk Power, 596 F.3d at
128.
136.
Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 206.
137.
United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139–40 (2006).
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settlement would not render 113(f)(3)(B) meaningless or superfluous since
section 113(f)(3)(B) would still have a unique, and necessary, role in providing an exclusive right of contribution for reimbursed costs.
As discussed below, a detailed reading of 113(f)(3)(B) suggests a role
for “superfluity” in interpreting the relationship among these sections.138
But it is simply incorrect to conclude that mutual remedies would render
113(f)(3)(B), as a whole, superfluous.
Statutory Interpretation Doctrines: Later in Time, Specific over General.
Several courts have relied on statutory interpretation rules to conclude that
113(f)(3)(B) is the exclusive remedy for recovery of costs incurred under an
approved CERCLA settlement.139 The logic is simple. Congress enacted
113(f) after 107, and 113(f) deals more specifically with the issue of contribution of costs incurred under a settlement agreement. Thus, 113(f)(3)(B)
must govern.
As discussed below, these doctrines may constitute a critical means of
resolving the fundamental issue of the relationship between 107(a)(4)(B)
and 113(f)(3)(B),140 but the mere fact that 113(f) was adopted after 107(a)
simply cannot mean that 113(f) always governs. Nowhere in the Supreme
Court’s analysis of the relationship between 107(a) and 113(f) in either
Cooper or Atlantic Research did the Court rely on these doctrines. Something
other than “later/more specific” drives the issue.
Procedural Distinctness. Several courts noted that, in Atlantic Research,
the Supreme Court indicated the remedies under 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f)(1)
arose in “procedurally distinct” contexts.141 Certainly costs directly incurred
following a settlement agreement and costs directly incurred by parties following a voluntary cleanup can be viewed as arising in procedurally distinct
circumstances, but that is an observation, not an argument.
The Supreme Court’s statement that claims under sections 107(a)(4)(B)
and 113(f)(1) were procedurally “distinct” arose in connection with the
Court’s assessment of the nature of the claim; costs that were directly and
voluntarily “incurred” did not fall within the common law concept of “contribution,” while money spent to reimburse the response costs of other
PRPs following a civil action or settlement fell within the meaning of contribution.142 Distinctness itself was not the issue; rather it was the nature of
138.
See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
139.
See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power, 596 F.3d at 128; see also Brief of the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Niagara Mohawk Power, 596 F.3d 112 (No. 083834).
140.
See infra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
141.
See Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 205; see also Morrison Enters. LLC v. Dravo Corp., 638
F.3d 594, 602 (8th Cir. 2011).
142.
See supra notes 101–07 and accompanying text.
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the distinction that drove the Supreme Court’s conclusion. In fact, the
Court acknowledged the possibility of “overlap” for claims arising under
other circumstances.143
Unfairness to Non-Settling Parties. For most courts, a critical factor was
the “unfairness” that would result if parties to a government settlement
were allowed to recover their response costs under section 107(a)(4)(B).144
In the absence of a settlement, a plaintiff suing under section 107(a)(4)(B)
seeks to recover all of its costs under the “joint and several” liability standard,145 but the defendant can counterclaim for contribution under
113(f)(1). It is through this counterclaim that the court can assure equitable
allocation of costs.146 If, however, a settling party were allowed to sue under
107(a)(4)(B), the defendant would be barred from asserting a counterclaim
by the “contribution protection” afforded the plaintiff in the settlement.
This would potentially allow settling parties to recover all of their costs
without providing an opportunity for equitable allocation by the court.147 In
some courts’ view, this would unfairly allow settling parties to “exploit” contribution protection to “shift full liability onto the target of his suit, a result
antithetical to the purpose of the statute.”148
This conclusion, even if correct, does not necessarily suggest that CERCLA precludes settling parties from suing under section 107(a)(4)(B). It
could also be said that this result is consistent with Congress’ intent to
encourage settlement and penalize non-settling parties. But the policy concern itself seems somewhat beside the point. The issue is whether CERCLA, in this context, establishes 113(f) as the exclusive remedy. In neither
Cooper nor Atlantic Research did the Supreme Court suggest that policy reasons should drive interpretation of the statute. As noted above, the Court in
143.
United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139 n.6 (2006).
144.
See, e.g., Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2012); Agere
Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 228–29 (3d Cir. 2010).
145.
According to one court, “[s]ection 107 allows for complete cost recovery under a
joint and several liability scheme; one PRP can potentially be accountable for the entire
amount expended to remove or remediate hazardous materials.” Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2010).
146.
See Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 140.
147.
See, e.g., Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1236–37; Agere Systems, 602 F.3d at 228. One court
did not agree, suggesting that the joint and several liability standard of section 107(a)(4)(B)
would allow cost allocation by the court. See Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 205 (7th
Cir. 2012).
The problem, of course, is that section 107(a) does not always impose joint and several
liability. Apportionment is proper on a cost recovery claim where there is a reasonable basis
for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.
148.
Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 205 (citing Solutia, 672 F.3d at 1237 and Agere Systems, 602
F.3d at 228–29).
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Cooper was willing to sacrifice “contribution protection” on the altar of plain
meaning and textual fidelity.149
Voluntary/Involuntary. Some courts, noting language from Cooper and
Atlantic Research, have suggested that the allocation of claims under sections
107(a) and 113(f) is based on whether costs were “voluntarily” or “involuntarily” incurred.150 But allocation between 107 and 113 cannot simply be based
on some “voluntary/involuntary” distinction. In Atlantic Research, the Court
held that response costs that were “voluntarily” incurred could not be recovered under section 113(f)(1), in part because they did not fall under the
common law concept of contribution.151 The Court simply did not discuss
whether costs that were involuntarily incurred, such as those incurred under
a UAO, can only be recovered through contribution. Indeed, the Court in
Cooper suggested the issue of cost recovery following a UAO would depend
on whether the order was a “civil action” for the purposes of section
113(f)(1).152 Further, the Court never suggested that costs that were “voluntarily” incurred pursuant to a negotiated settlement agreement could only
be recovered under 107(a)(4)(B). In other words, the Supreme Court never
relied on the voluntary/involuntary distinction as the basis for allocation.
The issue of whether a payment was “voluntary” was relevant only to an
assessment of whether reimbursed costs were recoverable under common
law concepts of contribution, not because of any inherent significance of a
voluntary/involuntary distinction under CERCLA.153
149.
See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
150.
See Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 2014);
Morrison Enters. v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 604 (8th Cir. 2011). But see Bernstein, 733
F.3d at 209 (rejecting involuntary/voluntary distinction as basis for distinguishing claims
under sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f)); Whittaker Corp. v. United States, No. CV 13–1741
FMO, 2014 WL 631113 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014) (discussing and rejecting or distinguishing
cases allegedly relying on voluntary/involuntary distinction).
In Appleton Papers, Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., the district court stated that,
following Cooper/Atlantic Research, “[c]osts incurred involuntarily (e.g., as the result of adverse litigation or Government order) must be recovered through a contribution action under
§ 113(f).” 572 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1041 (E.D. Wis. 2008) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.,
NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Co., 768 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2014). As discussed above,
this statement is wrong in almost all of its particulars. The Supreme Court did not rely on
any voluntary/involuntary distinction in discussing the relationship of 107(a) and 113(f). Nor
did the Court address the issue of the cost recovery following a government Unilateral Administrative Order.
151.
See supra notes 101–07 and accompanying text.
152.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
153.
This is consistent with language in Morrison Enterprises. There the court held that
payments made pursuant to a consent decree were “involuntary,” and thus within the common law concepts of contribution, since the consent decree was entered following an initial
action by the government under 107(a)(4)(A) that addressed an underlying common liability.
Morrison Enters., 638 F.3d at 604.
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Enforcement Action. Some courts have also suggested that a relevant factor in determining the appropriate cause of action is whether the costs are
incurred pursuant to an “enforcement action.”154 The court in Morrison Enterprises, for example, suggested that parties “subject to 106 or 107 enforcement actions are still required to use 113.”155 This reference to “enforcement
actions” is, however, based on an improper citation to Atlantic Research. The
reference in Atlantic Research to “enforcement actions” refers to a statement
in a lower court opinion not endorsed by the Supreme Court.156 The issue
of what constitutes an “enforcement action” under CERCLA is complex and
involves the related issue of UAOs.157 The Supreme Court did not, in either
Cooper or Atlantic Research, base its holdings on the existence of an “enforcement action.”
Consistency with Cooper and Atlantic Research. Courts have indicated
that a finding of “mutual exclusivity” is “consistent” with the holdings of
Cooper and Atlantic Research.158 As discussed, however, Atlantic Research held
that sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f), in the specific circumstances discussed
by the court, do not overlap and thus provide the exclusive remedies in
distinct procedural settings.159 The Court did not, however, address the relationship between these sections in other contexts. Consistency with both
Cooper and Atlantic Research requires adherence to the Court’s approach and
logic, not its specific conclusions simply transferred to other contexts.
154.
See NCR Corp., 768 F.3d at 690; Morrison Enters., 638 F.3d at 603; Lyondell Chem.
Co. v. Albemarle Corp., No. 1:01-CV-890, 2007 WL 5517453, at *209 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 12,
2007) (“PRPs may only seek contribution for costs during or following an enforcement
action.”).
155.
Morrison Enters., 638 F.3d at 603.
156.
In an amicus brief, the government suggested that the fact that the Supreme Court
quoted the lower court “immediately before its statement of affirmance” is somehow relevant
in interpreting the actual analysis the Supreme Court provided. See United States’ Brief as
Amicus Curiae Addressing Issues Raised by Motions to Dismiss Certain Claims in Plaintiffs’
Third Amended Complaint at 24, Appleton Papers Inc. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co.,
572 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (No. 08-00016), 2008 WL 2463726.
157.
See infra notes 178–97. To the extent that an “enforcement action” seeks to impose
liability for violation of a statutory requirement, only actions to enforce CERCLA reporting
requirements, see CERCLA § 103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (2013), and actions to enforce
previously issued administrative orders, CERCLA § 106(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b), constitute
“enforcement actions.” Government litigation under section 107(a)(4)(A) seeks to recover
previously incurred government response costs, and a PRP is liable for those costs based on
its status as a PRP. There is no requirement that the government establish that the PRP
violated any law, including CERCLA.
158.
Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 768 (6th Cir. 2014). See
generally Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3843).
159.
See supra notes 98–107 and accompanying text.
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B. A Proper Basis for Exclusivity
Despite the consistency of the holdings of the courts of appeals, the
logic and textual analysis of these opinions seem unconvincing. Reliance on
the Supreme Court’s commitment to textual fidelity and means of analysis
suggests a simpler and more coherent approach to resolving the tangle of
unresolved issues. The approach involves three elements. First, it involves
determining whether the express rights of contribution found in 113(f) textually “overlap” with the direct right of cost recovery under 107(a)(4)(B).
Second, if there is textual overlap, the later and more specific provisions of
113(f) govern and provide the exclusive cause of action. Third, no implied
right of contribution exists for contribution claims that are not expressly
provided for in 113(f). This approach limits the contested issues to a textual
analysis of whether a claim falls under the provisions of 107(a)(4)(B) and
either 113(f)(1) or 113(f)(3)(B). Although policy or preference is not an
element of the allocation, application of these steps in fact produces a coherent structure to CERCLA.

1. Textual Overlap
The Supreme Court has defined situations in which sections 107(a) and
113(f) do not overlap.160 Following Cooper and Atlantic Research, the task is to
determine what class of claims “overlap” and thus potentially fall under the
terms of both sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f).
The scope of 107(a)(4)(B) seems clear: all costs that are “directly incurred” by a party fall under the textual scope of 107(a)(4)(B).161 This suggests that all response costs directly spent by a party to clean up a site fall
within the scope of 107(a)(4)(B) whether such costs were voluntarily incurred, involuntarily incurred pursuant to a UAO, or spent pursuant to an
obligation in a judicial or administrative settlement. In fact, only costs spent
to reimburse would not fall under section 107(a)(4)(B).
The more difficult issue is determining whether costs “directly incurred” following a civil action, settlement, or UAO also fall under section
113(f). At one level, the answer to this question is simple. Costs directly
incurred during or following a “civil action” fall within the scope of
113(f)(1). Further, costs that have been directly incurred by parties to an
“approved” judicial or administrative settlement fall within the scope of
113(f)(3)(B). Critically, the text addresses the issue. Section 113(f)(3)(B)
provides a right of contribution to persons who have resolved liability for “a
160.
See supra notes 98–107 and accompanying text.
161.
As the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., “§ 107(a)
permits a PRP to recover only the costs it has ‘incurred’ in cleaning up a site.” 551 U.S. 128,
139 (2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)).
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response action” or “the costs of such actions.”162 This disjunctive language
suggests that Congress provided a right of contribution in two distinct situations: (1) costs directly incurred in undertaking a response action; and (2)
costs incurred reimbursing the government for its “costs of such action.”163
In other words, the text supports a conclusion that 113(f)(3)(B) provides an
express right of contribution both for reimbursed and directly incurred
costs for those settlements that satisfy its requirements.
Although the Supreme Court’s discussion of “traditional” contribution
potentially confuses the scope of section 113(f), the Court’s analysis provides an important tool for determining the class of costs that falls within
the textual scope of 113(f). The Court has suggested that “directly incurred”
costs fall within the traditional concept of contribution if they arose as part
of a process (such as a civil action or settlement) that establishes that the
plaintiff shares common liability with the defendant in any subsequent contribution action.164

2. The Implied Right of Contribution
Although section 113(f) defines when statutory “contribution” is available, the situation is complicated by the fact that courts have found an implied “non-statutory” right of contribution in CERCLA that does not arise
under 113(f).165 Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly left unresolved the
issue of an implied right of contribution under CERCLA.166 Thus, it is
possible to imagine a situation in which costs falling outside of scope of
section 113(f), such as costs incurred pursuant to a UAO or costs incurred
following a non-approved settlement, could be recovered under some “implied” cause of action for contribution. If such an implied cause of action
exists, there would be a new overlap issue: are costs recoverable under an
implied right of contribution also recoverable under a direct cost recovery
action under section 107(a)(4)(B)?
162.
CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
163.
This is also consistent with the settlement provisions of section 122 that contain
separate and distinct authority to enter settlements to undertake work, authorized by 122(a),
and settlements to resolve government cost claims, authorized in 122(h). See CERCLA
§ 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622.
164.
See supra notes 117–25 and accompanying text.
165.
Indeed the court of appeal’s decision from which Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Atlantic Research had relied on the existence of an implied right of contribution to provide
the then uncertain right of cost recovery by PRPs. See Atl. Research Corp. v. United States,
459 F.3d 827, 835–36 (8th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court in Atlantic Research held that
PRPs could rely on the express right of cost recovery under 107(a)(4)(B) and declined to
resolve the issue of an implied cause of action. 511 U.S. at 141 n.8.
166.
See id.; see also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170 (2004)
(“[W]e decline to decide whether Aviall has an implied right to contribution under § 107.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA103.txt

150

unknown

Seq: 34

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

23-DEC-15

11:20

[Vol. 5:1

Identification of such an implied right of contribution is, however,
neither warranted nor necessary. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has
expressly indicated its reluctance to infer private rights of contribution arising from federal statute.167 Indeed, the need for adoption of the express
rights of contribution in 113(f) arose because Supreme Court jurisprudence
suggested that an implied right was not authorized.168 Further, although the
Court in Cooper and Atlantic Research declined to resolve the issue, a majority of the Court in Cooper strongly suggested that there was not a separate
implied right of contribution under CERCLA.169 Thus, there is a strong
basis for concluding that the Supreme Court would reject identification of
any independent implied right of contribution in CERCLA.
Further, such an implied right of contribution is not necessary. Courts
initially construed CERCLA as containing an implied right of contribution
as a means to provide for allocation of costs among PRPs.170 Section 113(f)
now creates the mechanisms to allow both for cost recovery and allocation
of response costs among PRPs in appropriate circumstances. There simply
is no need to invoke an implied right of contribution.

3. Treating Overlapping Causes of Action in CERCLA
Two conclusions follow from the preceding discussion: (1) the text of
sections 107(a) and 113(f) defines the exclusive causes of action for cost
recovery under CERLCA; and (2) they overlap where parties “directly incur” costs in situations that fall under the express provisions of 113(f)(1) and
113(f)(3)(B). But if the causes of action in 107(a) and 113(f) overlap, how
does one allocate between them? It is perfectly plausible that in the event of
overlap, both causes of action are available.171
But principles of statutory construction suggest that, in the face of directly overlapping statutory provisions, section 113(f) should provide the
exclusive cause of action. First, the Court has expressed a strong presumption that texts should be construed to avoid making provisions “superflu167.
See Cooper, 543 U.S. at 162 (discussing refusal of the Court to find implied or
common-law rights to contribution in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.
630 (1981) and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77 (1981)).
168.
See Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002), rev’d,
543 U.S. 157 (2004). The rights of contribution established in the 1986 SARA amendments
were adopted to “clarif[y] and confirm[ ]” the implied right of contribution threatened by
Supreme Court jurisprudence. See H.R. REP . NO. 99-253, pt. I, at 79 (1985), as reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861.
169.
See Cooper, 543 U.S. at 170–71.
170.
Id. at 162.
171.
See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
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ous.”172 As mentioned above, courts have referred to this canon, but have
applied it incorrectly.173 The issue is not whether 113(f)(3)(B) will be rendered superfluous as a whole—113(f)(3)(B) would still have a unique role in
authorizing contribution for reimbursed costs even if 107(a) were also available for directly incurred costs.
The issue of “superfluity” is more nuanced. As discussed above, section
113(f)(3)(B) provides for a right of contribution in two situations: where a
party has resolved its liability for some or all “of a response action” or “of
the costs of such action.”174 If 107(a) provides a cause of action for recovery
of the direct costs of a response action, the separate authorization of contribution for costs “of a response action” was unnecessary when SARA was
adopted, and it is this specific phrase, not 113(f)(3)(B) as a whole, that
would become surplusage if an alternative cost recovery action under
107(a)(4)(B) is available.
Second, canons of construction suggest that, in the context of “overlapping” statutory provisions, the provision that was adopted “later in time”
and which contains more “specific” elements should be treated as impliedly
repealing application of the earlier and less specific statute.175 Section 113(f)
was adopted in the SARA amendments of 1986 and contains Congress’ specific statement of the requirements governing “contribution” claims; it defines both the scope and mechanisms of contribution under CERCLA.
Although “implied repeal” is not favored,176 these later and more specific
authorizations of contribution for “directly incurred” costs justify a conclusion that they operate to replace any overlapping cause of action in
172.
See, e.g., Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004); United States v. Nordic Village,
Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35–36 (1992), superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, as recognized in In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743,
749 (7th Cir. 2014); N. SINGER & S. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 46.06, at 181–86 (rev. 6th ed. 2000) (“A statute should be construed so that effect is given
to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant . . . .”).
173.
See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.
174.
See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
175.
See, e.g., Sorenson v. Sec. of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851 (1986); Smith v. Robinson,
468 U.S. 992 (1984), superseded by statute, Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 90-538, 82 Stat. 901, as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S.
211 (1995); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF L EGAL TEXTS 327–33 (2012).
176.
See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) (“It is a cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication are not favored. When there are two acts upon
the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible.”); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 550 (1974) (holding that repeal by implication requires that the later and earlier statutes
be “irreconcilable”); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124,
141–42 (2001) (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 550).
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107(a)(4)(B).177 Indeed, they make little sense unless Congress intended
that they replace the broader pre-existing right of cost recovery.
The result is that reimbursed costs or costs that are directly incurred
following a judicial or administratively approved settlement that falls under
the text of 113(f) are exclusively recoverable through statutory contribution
under 113(f). All other directly incurred costs are recoverable exclusively
through an action for cost recovery under 107(a)(4)(B).

IV. TEXTUAL ALLOCATION OF CAUSES

OF

ACTION

Based on the premises discussed above, determination of the proper
cause of action under CERCLA becomes an exercise of statutory construction of the textual scope of sections 113(f)(1) and 113(f)(3)(B).

A. Costs Incurred Under a Unilateral Administrative Order
As discussed above, response costs may be incurred under the compulsion of a Unilateral Administrative Order. Clearly, such costs are “directly
incurred” and thus fall within the express scope of 107(a)(4)(B). The only
issue is whether such costs arise during or following a “civil action” and thus
also fall within the scope of 113(f)(1).178 If a UAO does not arise during or
following a “civil action,” the only available cause of action for recovery of
costs incurred is 107(a)(4)(B).
177.
The provisions of section 113(f) constitute what Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner,
citing Posadas v. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936), have characterized
as a “Type 2” basis for an implied repeal: a later act that covers the whole subject of the
earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 175.
178.
Such costs do not arise from a “judicial or administratively approved settlement”
and thus section 113(f)(3)(B) does not apply.
Further, an additional reason exists for not construing costs incurred under a UAO as
falling within the scope of section 113(f)(1): these costs do not satisfy the Court’s conception
of traditional contribution. See supra notes 117–25 and accompanying text. EPA’s authority to
impose cleanup obligations though a UAO under section 106(a) is not limited to PRPs: it
may be issued to anyone if “necessary to protect the public health, welfare or the environment.” CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2013). In general, EPA does direct UAOs
to the class of PRPs defined in section 107(a). But EPA has stated:
[S]ection 106 does not limit issuance of orders to these PRPs. In appropriate cases,
unilateral orders may be issued to parties other than those specified in section
107(a), if actions by such parties are necessary to protect the public health, welfare,
or the environment. For example, a unilateral order may be issued to the owner of
land adjoining the site, to obtain site access. A unilateral order also may be issued
to prevent a non-PRP from interfering with a response action.
U.S. ENVTL . PROT. AGENCY, OSWER DIRECTIVE NO. 9833.0-1A, GUIDANCE ON CERCLA 106(A)
UNILATERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS FOR REMEDIAL DESIGNS AND REMEDIAL ACTIONS 12–13 (1998),
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/cerc106-uao-rpt.pdf. Thus, compliance with a UAO does not inherently involve a determination that the recipient is a PRP.
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Most, but not all, of the courts to address this issue have concluded that
UAOs are not “civil actions.” In Pharmacia Corporation v. Clayton Chemical
Acquisition LLC, the court held that a UAO is not a civil action since “the
natural meaning of ‘civil action’ is a non-criminal judicial proceeding.”179 In
the court’s view, this natural reading was consistent with the use of the
phrase in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Black’s Law Dictionary, and
treatises.180 In contrast, the court held that the phrase “administrative order”
is not synonymous with “civil action” and that it applies to an administrative
and not a judicial order.181 The court also noted that treatment of a UAO as
a civil action would not “harmonize” with other sections of CERCLA.182
The court also noted that its conclusion was consistent with section 106(a),
which gives EPA the option of compelling cleanup through either an administrative or judicial process.183 The court found “that the distinction
made by the drafters demonstrates they saw a distinction between a civil
action and administrative actions and orders.”184 Finally, the court noted
that the provisions of 113(g)(3)(B), providing the statute of limitations applicable to contribution actions, were consistent with this construction. Section 113(g)(3)(B) measures the limitation period from the date of
“judgment,” and thus “supports this Court’s finding that an administrative
order does not qualify as a civil action as no judgment exists as to an administrative order.”185
Other courts have reached the same conclusion. In Blue Tee Corp. v.
Asarco Inc., the court discussed competing arguments and simply held that a
UAO was not a civil action.186 In two other cases, Raytheon Aircraft Co. v.
United States187 and Emhart Industries v. New England Container Co.,188 the
courts largely relied on the plain meaning and the precedents of Pharmacia
and Blue Tee to conclude that a UAO was not a civil action.189
These cases arose after Cooper but before Atlantic Research. One court,
in an opinion written after Atlantic Research, has “indirectly” addressed the
179.
Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisition LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1087
(S.D. Ill. 2005).
180.
Id.
181.
Id.
182.
Id.
183.
Id. at 1088.
184.
Id. at 1087.
185.
Id. at 1088.
186.
Blue Tee Corp. v. Asarco Inc., No. 03-5011-CV-SW-F-JG, 2005 WL 1532955, at
*3–4 (W.D. Miss. June 27, 2005).
187.
Raytheon Aircraft v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (D. Kan. 2006).
188.
Emhart Indus. v. New Eng. Container Co., 478 F. Supp. 2d 199, 203 (D.R.I.
2007).
189.
Emhart, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 203; Raytheon Aircraft, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA103.txt

154

unknown

Seq: 38

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

23-DEC-15

11:20

[Vol. 5:1

issue. In American Premier Underwriters v. General Electric Co., the court,
resolving a statute of limitations issue, concluded that a UAO was not a
“judgment” as the term was used in section 113(g)(3)(A) and that the effective date of the UAO did not trigger the running of the statute of limitations.190 In a footnote, the court noted that it was “aware that indirectly it is
concluding that the issuance of a UAO itself is not a ‘civil action’ as that
term is used in section 9613(f)(1).”191
Only one court has held that a UAO is a “civil action” for purposes of
113(f)(1).192 In Carrier Corp. v. Piper, the court found that a UAO should be
treated as a civil action.193 This conclusion was based, in part, on a preCooper/Atlantic Research Sixth Circuit case that had “suggested that the issuance of an administrative order under § 106 satisfies the requirements of
§ 113(f)(1).”194 In addition, the court in Carrier Corp. noted that compliance
with a UAO places a burden comparable to that imposed by a judicial
order.195
Nothing beyond the most straightforward textual reading is necessary
to conclude that UAOs are not civil actions and thus not within the scope of
113(f)(1). Limiting the cause of action to 107(a)(4)(B) would also, as it happens, result in a largely coherent structure to CERCLA. The statute of
limitations for cost recovery would be governed by section 113(g)(2), and
the “trigger date” for the statute of limitations would arise from the date of
the response action, not from the date of the UAO.196 It would also ensure
equitable allocation of costs among PRPs. Although an action under
107(a)(4)(B) would allow a plaintiff to assert “joint and several” liability, the
defendant in such an action could assert a counterclaim under the express
190.
Am. Premier Underwriters Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 866 F. Supp. 2d 883, 905 (S.D.
Ohio 2012).
191.
Id. at 905 n.24.
192.
Since Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004) and United
States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2006), other courts have suggested that costs
incurred “involuntarily” or following an “enforcement action” are recoverable through contribution. See supra notes 150–57 and accompanying text. This would also suggest that costs
incurred following a UAO are recoverable under 113(f)(1). But as discussed above, a focus on
these elements is not based on any text in 113(f) or the rationale employed by the Supreme
Court in Cooper or Atlantic Research. See supra notes 130–59 and accompanying text.
193.
Carrier Corp. v. Piper, 460 F. Supp. 2d 827, 841 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).
194.
Id. at 840. In the prior case, Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap & Metal Corp., the
Sixth Circuit had held that contribution under § 113(f)(1) is available where a PRP “has been
compelled to pay for response costs for which others are also liable, and who seeks reimbursement for such costs.” 153 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998), abrogated by Hobart Corp. v.
Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2014).
195.
Carrier Corp., 460 F. Supp. 2d at 841 (“In terms of the burden it places on a party, a
UAO is similar to a judgment issued pursuant to a court proceeding.”).
196.
See Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1192–94 (10th Cir. 1997).
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provisions of 113(f)(1) (right of contribution “during or following” a civil
action under 107). Through this counterclaim, the court could undertake an
“equitable allocation” of the costs. The key to this equitable allocation is that
parties responding to a UAO will not, themselves, have received contribution protection.
The only problem with allowing a party to a UAO to proceed through
107(a)(4)(B) is that it limits the significance of “contribution protection”
provided to settling parties. In other words, parties who avoided a UAO by
settling with the government will still be subject to a 107(a)(4)(B) action by
non-settling parties. This, however, is a concern that the Supreme Court in
Atlantic Research both acknowledged and accepted as a permissible consequence of application of the plain terms of the statute.197

B. Costs Directly Incurred Under an Approved
Section 113(f)(3)(B) Settlement
As discussed above, the text of section 113(f)(3)(B) specifically provides
a right of contribution for costs directly incurred pursuant to an approved
settlement.198 If costs were incurred pursuant to such a settlement, they
would be recoverable exclusively through an action for contribution under
113(f)(3)(B).199
Limiting recovery of costs incurred under an appropriate 113(f)(3)(B)
settlement to an action for contribution creates, for the most part, a coherent structure to CERCLA. Settling parties suing for contribution would
only be allowed recovery based on a standard of equitable allocation. No
counterclaim for contribution by defendants, a counterclaim presumably
barred by the terms of the settlement, is necessary to ensure such allocation.
It is the plaintiff’s initial contribution claim that triggers equitable
allocation.200
Three issues do arise, however, when considering the scope of contribution under 113(f)(3)(B): (1) what settlements fall within 113(f)(3)(B); (2)
197.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
198.
See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
199.
Costs reimbursed to the government in a civil action or settlement are recoverable
exclusively in an action under 113(f) since they are not “directly incurred.” A typical CERCLA settlement will, however, also require the settling party to reimburse the government
for “future costs” incurred by the government after entry of the settlement agreement. Reimbursement of these future government costs does not, however, involve the issue of “overlap,”
and the exclusive cause of action for their recovery would be an action for contribution under
113(f).
200.
The problem created by providing a right of contribution for costs directly incurred
pursuant to a settlement is determining the appropriate statute of limitations. See infra notes
228–40 and accompanying text.
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what costs are recoverable following such a settlement; and (3) what is the
applicable statute of limitations?

1. Elements of a Section 113(f)(3)(B) Settlement
Although courts of appeals have uniformly concluded that 113(f)(3)(B)
constitutes the exclusive vehicle for recovery of costs incurred under an
approved administrative or judicial settlement, they have differed as to what
elements are necessary to satisfy the requirements of section 113(f)(3)(B).201
These required elements include both substantive and procedural components, but, as one court noted, the “defining feature” of an administrative
settlement is that the agreement “resolve[s] [the PRP’s] liability to the
United States or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or
all of the costs of such action.”202
Several issues have arisen in determining whether a settlement falls
under 113(f)(B).
Settlement of CERCLA Liability. Several courts have held that an approved settlement must specifically resolve liability under CERCLA.203 In
Consolidated Edison, Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., the court held that settlements
that resolved state, but not CERCLA, cost recovery claims do not constitute approved 113(f)(3)(B) settlements.204 Other courts have held otherwise.205 The Third Circuit, in Trinity Industries v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.,
expressly rejected this position and held that the express language of
113(f)(3)(B) applied to settlements by “States” that resolved the settling
201.
This issue, critical to determining the availability of an action for contribution
under section 113(f)(3)(B), can also be relevant for determining both “contribution protection” under section 113(f)(2), see, e.g., Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
No. 1:09–CV–0821, 2015 WL 412324, at *5–7 (M.D. Pa. 2015), and the appropriate statute
of limitations under section 113(g), see Asarco LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 73 F. Supp. 3d
1285, 1293–95 (D. Mont. 2014). As discussed below, the statute of limitations issue raises
distinct questions. See infra notes 230–40 and accompanying text.
202.
See Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 768 (6th Cir. 2014).
203.
See Consol. Edison, Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2005);
Asarco, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R., No. CV 04–2144–PHX–SRB, 2006 WL 173662, at *1 (D.
Ariz. Jan. 24, 2006).
204.
Consol. Edison of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d at 96; see also W.R. Grace &
Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2009). The Second Circuit raised
some doubt about the continuing validity of the holding in these cases in Niagara Mowhawk
Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 126 n.15 (2d Cir. 2010).
205.
See, e.g., Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir.
2013); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States, No. H–10–23862015, 2015 WL 3513949, at *20
(S.D. Tex. June 4, 2015); Asarco LLC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 73 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1291 (D.
Mont. 2014).
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party’s liability for “response costs.”206 This, in the court’s view, included
state settlements that did not expressly resolve CERCLA claims.207
Contingent Covenant Not to Sue. Under 113(f)(3)(B), a settlement must
“resolve some or all” of the settling party’s liability. Resolution of liability
with the United States is generally expressed in CERCLA settlements by
inclusion of a “covenant not to sue” stating that the government will not sue
a settling party for additional relief for the matters addressed within the
scope of the settlement.208 Most courts have indicated that the inclusion of
an express “covenant not to sue” satisfies the requirement that the settlement resolve the settling parties’ liability.209
However, several courts have held that settlements that expressly condition the “covenant not to sue” on completion of the actions required under
the settlement do not “resolve” liability. In ITT Industries v. BorgWarner,
Inc., for example, the court said that an AOC did not “resolve” liability
where the government retained the power to terminate the covenant if the
settling party did not satisfactorily comply with the requirements of the
AOC.210 In Bernstein v. Bankert,211 the court held that an AOC that made
the “covenant not to sue” effective only upon completion of the requirements of the settlement did not “resolve” liability.212 Thus, costs incurred
under such a settlement would not be recoverable under 113(f)(3)(B) until
206.
Trinity Industries, 735 F.3d at 135–37.
207.
Id. at 136.
208.
See CERCLA § 122(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f) (2013).
209.
See, e.g., NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682, 692 (7th Cir.
2014). In NCR Corp., for example, the court found that a consent decree that contained an
immediately effective “covenant not to sue” satisfied section 113(f)(B) even though the agreement provided that the government conditioned the covenant on “satisfactory performance”
of the settling party’s obligations. Id. The court stated that this constituted
a standard arrangement that is consistent with the fact that neither the EPA nor
Wisconsin could sue NCR if it complied with its obligations. The agreement resolved NCR’s liability, and so the district court correctly held that it limited NCR
to proceeding under section 113(f). To hold otherwise would mean that no consent
order could resolve a party’s liability until the work under it was complete. Such a
rule would be contrary both to the analysis in Bernstein and to common sense.
Id.
210.
ITT Indus. v. BorgWarner Inc., 506 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2008).
211.
Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2012).
212.
Id. at 220–21. The court considered, but rejected, the argument that a conditional
“covenant not to sue” still “resolves” liability in a meaningful sense. Id. at 210-14. This seems
an odd conclusion: even a conditional settlement defines the requirements that must be met
to obtain a covenant not to sue, and it thus converts a party’s “joint and several” liability to a
discrete set of requirements that define the totality of the obligation of the settling party
with respect to the matters addressed in the settlement. Presumably a party who has entered
into an enforceable agreement to pay a defined portion of the government’s prior cleanup
costs has “resolved” its liability even before it has actually paid the amount.
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all of the actions required under the settlement are completed and the covenant not to sue becomes effective.
This seems an odd requirement for determining whether a settlement
resolves liability for purposes of 113(f)(3)(B). CERCLA itself provides that
a covenant not to sue “shall be subject to the satisfactory performance by
such party of its obligations under the agreement concerned.”213 Indeed, at
least for remedial action settlements, CERCLA provides that a covenant
not to sue “shall not take effect” until completion of the remedial action.214
A settlement agreement, conditional or not, places limits on the liability of
the settling party and thus, to that extent, “partially resolves” the defendants’ liabilities. For the most part, however, this is a drafting issue. The
court in Bernstein itself suggested that this issue could be addressed by revised drafting of the agreement. If the settlement provides that the covenant not to sue is immediately effective it will effectively “resolve” liability
even if a subsequent breach subjects a settling party to liability.215 In 2014,
EPA revised its model settlement language to ensure that the covenants
were effective on the date of the effective date of the settlement.216
Admission of Liability. Some courts have indicated that a settlement
agreement cannot “resolve” liability as required by section 113(f)(3)(B) if it
does not include an admission of liability.217 Thus, a provision stating that
execution of the settlement does not constitute an admission of liability by
the settling party does not satisfy 113(f)(3)(B).218 Again, this seems an odd
requirement. CERCLA expressly provides that a CERCLA settlement may
include a provision stating that it “shall not be considered an admission of
liability for any purpose,”219 and it is hard to understand why an administrative settlement in which the settling party satisfies all of its CERCLA obligations has not resolved its liability simply because it has not confessed its
sins.
213.
CERCLA § 122(f)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(5). The court in Bernstein itself suggested that this issue can be addressed by revised drafting of the agreement: if the settlement
provides that the “covenant not to sue” is immediately effective it will “resolve” liability even
if a subsequent breach subjects a settling party to liability. 733 F.3d at 213.
214.
CERCLA § 122(f)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(3).
215.
Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 213.
216.
See 2014 EPA Revised Settlement Memo, supra note 33, at 5–6. EPA stated that “to
forestall any argument that liability is not resolved as of the effective date for purposes of
Section 113(f)(1), (f)(2), or (f)(3)(B), we are revising all of our settlement models to make
the covenant effective on the effective date of the settlement.” Id. at 5.
217.
See ITT Indus. v. BorgWarner, 506 F.3d 452, 460 (6th Cir. 2008); Bernstein, 733
F.3d at 212.
218.
See ITT Indus., 506 F.3d at 460.
219.
CERCLA § 122(d)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(C).
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Procedural Issues. Section 122 establishes specific procedures for approval of certain settlement agreements executed by the federal government, including an opportunity for public notice and comment.220 Several
courts have held that an administrative settlement, even if executed by a
state, that was entered without some opportunity for comment cannot constitute an approved settlement under 113(f)(3)(B).221 Since an approved settlement can extinguish the contribution claims of non-settling parties,
courts have indicated that due process requires some procedural
protections.222

2. Costs Recoverable Under a Section
113(f)(3)(B) Settlement
Parties to a 113(f)(3)(B) settlement may be required to incur costs
under the terms of the settlement, but they also may incur response costs
not mandated or otherwise falling within the scope of the settlement. Do
costs that are incurred subsequent to an approved settlement, but outside
the terms of the settlement, fall within the scope of section 113(f)(3)(B)?
EPA’s earlier model settlement agreements expressly provided that a
right of contribution under 113(f)(3)(B) was limited to “matters addressed”
in the settlement agreement.223 But there was, in EPA’s later view, a problem with this provision. Although 113(f)(2) limits “contribution protection”
to “matters addressed” in a settlement, no such language limits the right of
contribution in 113(f)(3)(B).224 Therefore, in 2014, EPA revised its model
settlement agreements to remove language that limited the right of contribution to matters addressed in the settlement.225
However, there must be some nexus between the costs that a settling
party seeks to recover through contribution and the matters addressed in
the settlement. Settlement with the government for some costs at a particular site is not a “golden ticket” that gives the settling party a right to contribution for any costs incurred anywhere else at any time.
220.
See CERCLA § 122(d)(2), (i), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2), 9622(i).
221.
Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 1:09–CV–0821, 2015 WL
412324, at *6 (M.D. Penn. Jan. 30, 2015); Litgo N.J., Inc. v. Bob Martin, No. 06-2891
(AET), 2010 WL 2400388, at *29 (D.N.J. June 10, 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.,
Litgo New Jersey Inc. v. Comm’r New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 725 F.3d 369 (3d Cir.
2013); CPC Intern. Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1283 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
222.
See, e.g., Am. Special Risk Ins., Co. v. City of Centerline, 180 F. Supp. 2d 903, 909
(S.D. Mich. 2001); Litgo N.J., 2010 WL 2400388, at *33.
223.
2014 EPA Revised Settlement Memo, supra note 33.
224.
CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
225.
2014 EPA Revised Settlement Memo, supra note 33.
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There are several ways to resolve this issue. First, and perhaps most
plausibly, the right of contribution under section 113(f)(3)(B) should be
limited to the matters addressed in the settlement.226 Although there is a
difference in language between 113(f)(2) and 113(f)(3)(B), nothing else suggests that Congress intended the scope of contribution protection for settling parties to be narrower than the scope of contribution granted these
same parties.
Alternatively, the text of 113(f)(3)(B) suggests a limitation. Section
113(f)(3)(B) creates a right of contribution for persons who have resolved
liability for “a response action.”227 Thus, it is possible that the right of contribution extends to costs incurred in the same response action at a site,
whether or not those costs were included within the settlement. The Supreme Court’s focus on “traditional” contribution may also help resolve this
issue.228 To the extent that a settlement agreement establishes that the settling party is a PRP at a specific site, it should also justify a right of contribution for any costs incurred by that party at the same site since the
settlement will have established the settling party’s “common liability” with
the defendant in any subsequent contribution action.

3. The Applicable Statute of Limitations
There is one particular problem created by limiting settling parties to
an action for contribution. The statute of limitations for such claims is governed by section 113(g)(3) which starts the three-year limitations period
from “the date of” the administrative settlement or “entry” of a judicially
approved settlement.229 Many courts have strictly applied this three-year
limitations period to contribution actions for recovery of costs incurred
under a 113(f)(3)(B) administrative or judicial settlement.230

226.
In City of Waukegan v. National Gypsum Co., the court refused to dismiss claims
under 107(a)(4)(B) for costs incurred that were allegedly outside the scope of actions required under a consent decree with EPA and the state. No. 07 C 5008, 2009 WL 4043295, at
*7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2009).
227.
CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B).
228.
See supra notes 118–24 and accompanying text.
229.
CERCLA § 113(g)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3).
230.
See, e.g., Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 772–73 (6th
Cir. 2014); Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 206–07 (7th Cir. 2013); Morrison Enters.,
LLC v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 607–10 (8th Cir. 2011); Chitayat v. Vanderbilt Assoc.,
702 F. Supp. 2d 69, 81–83 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Florida Power Corp. v. First Energy Corp., 54
F. Supp. 3d 860, 867 (N.D. Ohio 2014), rev’d, No. 14-4126, 2015 WL 6743513 (6th Cir.
Nov. 5, 2015).
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Although these dates make sense if recovery is for reimbursed costs
identified in the settlement,231 they are more problematic when applied to
recovery of costs that may be directly incurred long after the date of the
settlement. Strict application of the three-year limitations period in
113(g)(3) would mean that subsequently incurred costs could never be
recovered.
Prior to Cooper, many courts of appeals, construing all cost recovery by
PRPs as actions for contribution, had nonetheless applied the 107(a)(4)(B)
statute of limitations to directly incurred costs.232 In Cooper, however, the
Supreme Court rejected characterization of recovery for the costs of voluntary cleanups as contribution, and courts have, since Cooper, rejected the
application of the statute of limitations applicable to 107(a)(4)(B) to actions
for contribution under 113(f).233
There are at least two ways to resolve this potential concern. First, if
the claim arises under section 113(f)(3)(B), courts could simply apply the
three-year statute of limitations specified in 113(g)(3) from the date of the
settlement. This may not preclude a contribution claim for subsequently
incurred response costs. Plaintiffs subject to a 113(f)(3)(B) settlement could
file a contribution claim within three years of the date of the settlement
agreement both to recover any costs incurred at that point and to obtain a
judgment establishing the liability of non-settling parties.234 Costs subse231.
A distinct issue is raised when a settling party agrees to reimburse the government
for costs subsequently incurred by the government. See Am. Premier Underwriters Inc. v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 866 F. Supp. 2d 883, 905 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
232.
See Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 923–24 (5th Cir. 2000),
abrogated by Vine St. LLC v. Borg Warner Corp., 776 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015); Centerior
Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 1998), abrogated by
Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2014); Sun Co. v.
Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1193–94 (10th Cir. 1997). In Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
United States, the court stated that it would continue to apply the statute of limitations rule
from Geraghty & Miller until reversed by the Fifth Circuit. No. H–10–23862015, 2015 WL
3513949, at *20 (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2015).
233.
See Hobart, 758 F.3d at 733.
234.
Under CERCLA, the specific authorization in section 122(g)(2) to obtain a declaratory judgment applies only to an action under 107(a). See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. The general federal Declaratory would, however, authorize a party to seek a
declaration of a party’s liability in the context of a 113(f) action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202
(2013); see United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 46 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that nothing
precludes a finding that a declaratory judgment is available in both a cost recovery and
contribution action); Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 207 F.3d 1177, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that although section 113(g)(3) does not expressly provide for a right to a declaratory judgment in a contribution action, neither does it forbid them); see also Whittaker v.
United States, No. CV 13–1741 FMO (JCx), 2014 WL 631113 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014)
(addressing claims by plaintiff seeking declaratory judgment under both 113(g)(2) and the
Declaratory Relief Act). Ironically, this raises the issue of whether the subsequently adopted
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quently incurred should be recoverable through amendment to the original
complaint even if incurred more than three years from the date of the
settlement.235
Second, courts could apply the three-year statute of limitations in section 113(g)(3) but apply a “triggering” event other than the date of entry of
the settlement. Section 113(g)(3)(B) triggers the start of the limitations period only for administrative settlements issued under section 122(g) (de
minimis settlements) and 122(h) (settlement of government financial
claims).236 Authority to enter settlements requiring work by settling parties
is, however, found in section 122(a).237 In Hobart Corp., the court concluded
that the triggering events in section 113(g)(3)(B) did not apply to an administrative settlement issued under section 122(a). But, rather than conclude that there was no applicable statute of limitations period, the court
elected to “borrow” a triggering event. It concluded that the “most logical
and convenient” triggering event would be the effective date of the section
122(a) settlement.238
Thus, courts might determine that a distinct “trigger” applies to the
three-year statute of limitation for settlement agreements issued under section 122(a) that require subsequent expenditure of costs by settling parties.
Although the court in Hobart applied the effective date of a section 122(a)
settlement agreement,239 a more “logical and convenient” place to borrow a
triggering event is section 113(g)(2). This section, applicable to actions
under 107(a), establishes a limitation period triggered by actual on-site
cleanup activity.240 Alternatively, a court might determine that the “triggering event” for subsequently incurred costs is the date the costs were
incurred.241
and more specific provisions of CERCLA should be construed to impliedly repeal the application of the Declaratory Judgment Act. See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
235.
See FED. R. CIV . P. 15(c)(1)(B); Asarco, LLC, v. Union Pac. Co., 765 F.3d 999,
1005–07 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Asarco LLC v. Goodwin, 756 F.3d 191, 202–03 (2d Cir.
2014) (rejecting “relation back” of new CERCLA claim for response costs arising from “different conduct, in a different location, and attributable to different entities”).
236.
CERCLA § 113(g)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3)(B) (2013).
237.
CERCLA § 122(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a).
238.
Hobart Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc., 758 F.3d 757, 775 (6th Cir. 2014); see
also N. States Power Co. v. City of Ashland, No. 12–cv–602–bbc, 2015 WL 1243597, at
*9–10 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 18, 2015).
239.
See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
240.
CERCLA § 113(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2).
241.
The critical justification for establishing a differing trigger event was that section
113(g)(3) is silent as to the triggering event for section 122(a) settlements. There are, however, two situations where a party will be required to pay costs arising long after the date of
settlement for which there is no “void” in the triggering language. First, there is no textual
void with respect to costs incurred following a judicial settlement; 113(g)(3)(B) provides that
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C. Costs Incurred Under a Non-113(f)(3)(B)
Government Settlement
In most cases, judicial or administrative settlements with the federal or
state governments should satisfy section 113(f)(3)(B). Courts have given a
sufficient indication of the necessary elements of an approved settlement,
and EPA has revised its model settlement language accordingly.242 But if
the settlement does not meet the requirements, the applicable cause of action may hinge on the process through which the settlement is
implemented.
If a non-113(f)(3)(B) settlement arises solely through an administrative
process, such as an ASAOC, the resolution seems clear. The costs are “directly incurred” and do not arising during or following a civil action or
through an approved settlement. There is no overlap between 107(a) and
113(f) and the only available cause of action is cost recovery under
107(a)(4)(B).243
But many government settlements are implemented through “consent
decrees.”244 In these cases, the government files a civil action and the court
incorporates the settlement in a judicial consent decree.245 In EPA’s view, it
is “self-evident” that any CERCLA settlement with the United States embodied in a judicially approved consent decree satisfies the requirements of
section 113(f)(3)(B).246 Perhaps. But not all administratively approved setthe statute of limitations is triggered by “the entry of a judicially approved settlement with
respect to such costs or damages.” CERCLA § 113(g)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3)(B).
The only possible void is to construe this section as only applying to that portion of a
judicially approved settlement that requires reimbursement of previously incurred costs. Second, a typical settlement agreement will require settling parties to reimburse the government
for costs subsequently incurred by the government. Section 112(h) provides the authority to
enter such an agreement that settles a government cost claim, and these settlements are
expressly addressed in 113(g)(3)(B). CERCLA § 112(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(h). The ability to
“borrow” a triggering event for these situations is unclear.
242.
See supra note 33.
243.
As the court in Bernstein v. Bankert stated, “[a]s soon as the settling PRP incurs
response costs consistent with the national contingency plan, and until liability is resolved
[through an approved section 113(f)(3)(B) settlement], that settling PRP has access to a cost
recovery action.” 733 F.3d 190, 214 (7th Cir. 2013); see also W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v.
Zotos Int’l, Inc., 553 F.3d 85, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that costs incurred under a
settlement with the state that did not qualify under section 113(f)(3)(B) were recoverable
under section 107(a)).
244.
These include, at a minimum, federal settlements involving performance of a longterm “remedial” action. See CERCLA § 122(d)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A).
245.
See id.
246.
2009 EPA Revised Settlement Memo, supra note 33, at 6. In its 2014 Memo revising model language, EPA apparently had second thoughts. Although not rejecting the language in the 2009 Memo (“[w]e still do not believe this language is legally necessary”), EPA
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tlements satisfy 113(f)(3)(B), and the same elements that are necessary to
ensure that an administrative settlement “resolves” liability may be required
to constitute an approved 113(f)(3)(B) consent decree.247
Nonetheless, costs directly incurred under a “non-approved” judicial
consent decree would still be recoverable through contribution. Costs directly incurred pursuant to a consent decree, even if the consent decree does
not satisfy the requirements under 113(f)(3)(B), could be construed as arising “during or following” a “civil action.” In that case, there is overlap between 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f)(1), and such costs would be recoverable
exclusively through the action for contribution under 113(f)(1).248 This, of
course, applies only if the “civil action” arises under 107(a); costs incurred
under a judicial settlement in state court would not fall under the terms of
113(f)(1).249 If the state settlement did not satisfy the requirements of
113(f)(3)(B), any costs incurred under its provisions would only be recoverable under 107(a)(4)(B).

D. Costs Incurred Under a Judicial Settlement
Among Private Parties
Private settlements reached during or following a civil action under
107(a)(4)(B) raise their own difficult questions. To the extent that a judicial
settlement to such a “civil action” involves reimbursement of a plaintiff’s
previously incurred response costs, Atlantic Research indicates that the exclusive vehicle for cost recovery by the settling party is section 113(f)(1). In
other words, if Party B agrees, in a judicially approved settlement, to reimburse Party A, Party B has a right of contribution under 113(f)(1) against
Party C for recovery of these reimbursed costs.
The treatment of response costs “directly incurred” by a party pursuant
to a judicially approved private settlement raises more complex issues. On
the one hand, such costs are directly incurred and fall under section
has now added language in its model consent decree stating that the consent decree satisfies
113(f)(3)(B). 2014 EPA Revised Settlement Memo, supra note 33, at 5.
247.
See supra notes 201–22 and accompanying text.
248.
See 2009 EPA CERCLA Settlement Memo, supra note 33, at 6. This, of course,
creates an anomaly; both 113(f)(1) and 113(f)(3)(B) create a separate right of contribution
following a judicial settlement. See Bernstein, 733 F.3d at 201 n.7. If any costs incurred
following a civil action are recoverable under 113(f)(1), then the provisions of 113(f)(3)(B)
that authorize contribution following a “judicially approved” settlement become superfluous.
This problem is avoidable by drafting settlements that satisfy 113(f)(3)(B).
249.
Jurisdiction for cost recovery under section 107(a) is exclusively in federal district
court. CERCLA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (“Except as provided in subsections (a) and
(h) of this section, the United States district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under this chapter.”).
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107(a)(4)(B).250 On the other hand, since they arise “during or following” a
civil action, they may also fall within the scope of section 113(f)(1).251 Determining whether such costs are recoverable under sections 107(a)(4)(B) or
113(f) depends on whether the causes of action overlap in these cases. If the
sections overlap, presumably the exclusive cause of action for recovery of
such costs would be 113(f)(1).
But do all cleanup costs incurred following a civil action fall within the
scope of 113(f)(1)?252 The answer lies in the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Atlantic Research. As discussed above, the Supreme Court stated that a right
of contribution exists under 113(f)(1) because the plaintiff, in a prior or
pending civil action, was found to share a “common liability” with the defendant in the subsequent contribution action.253 This suggests that a prior
civil action will trigger a right of contribution under section 113(f)(1) only if
the prior action established that the plaintiff was jointly liable with the
defendant for the costs it seeks to recover in the action for contribution.254
Since PRPs share joint and several liability for costs arising at a site,
this will involve a determination, not that the prior litigation involved the
same costs, but that the prior litigation involved the same site. In other
words, if the prior civil action established that the plaintiff seeking contribution was a PRP at the same site as the defendant PRP, then sections
113(f)(1) and 107(a)(4)(B) overlap and the only available remedy is under
250.
See CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
251.
See CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
252.
The court in Whittaker v. United States addressed a variation of this issue: whether
costs directly incurred prior to a civil action could only be recovered in a subsequent contribution action under section 113(f)(1). No. CV 13-1741, 2014 WL 631113, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 10, 2014). The facts were somewhat unusual. The case at issue involved an action to
recover cleanup costs at a specific “Site.” The predicate civil action, previously brought under
section 107(a)(4)(B), involved a judicial settlement of the clean-up costs at an off-site location. Id. Citing United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2006), the court concluded
that the prior civil action established the plaintiff’s “common liability” at the Site, and thus
the current action could proceed only under section 113(f)(1). Whittaker, 2014 WL 631113, at
*7–10.
253.
This situation would fall within the Court’s statement of the “traditional” meaning
of contribution. See supra notes 118–25 and accompanying text (discussing the “traditional”
meaning of contribution).
254.
The court in Whittaker correctly observed:
The scope of a contribution claim under § 113(f)(1) is not limited to the liability
resolved in an administrative or judicially approved settlement. As the Supreme
Court stated in Atlantic Research, “§ 113(f)(1) permits suit before or after the establishment of common liability.” In other words, the availability of a contribution claim
under § 113(f)(1) does not depend on what liability might ultimately be resolved in s [sic]
settlement, but on whether there are other PRPs who share common liability for the contaminated site at issue.
2014 WL 631113, at * 7 (emphasis added) (citing Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 138–39).
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113(f)(1). If the prior litigation did not establish that the plaintiff was a
PRP at the same site, there is no overlap and only 107(a)(4)(B) is available.

E. Costs Incurred or Reimbursed Pursuant to a Non-Judicial
Agreement Among Private Parties
Private parties may reach agreement among themselves both to reimburse response costs and to directly incur response costs through agreements that do not arise “during or following” a civil action. Reimbursement
and cleanup obligations may arise, for example, through an indemnity
agreement or other private agreement to contribute to the costs of a
cleanup. Cleanup costs that are “directly incurred” pursuant to non-judicial
settlements would only fall under the express language of 107(a)(4)(B) and,
following Cooper and Atlantic Research, there should be no doubt that this is
the exclusive cause of action for recovery of these costs.
Payments to reimburse others or provide money for others to undertake
a cleanup pursuant to a non-judicial settlement raise different issues. Such
payments are not, in an obvious sense, “directly incurred,” nor are they imposed pursuant to a judicial or administrative settlement. One court has
resolved this issue by holding that such costs are, in fact, “incurred” for
purposes of section 107(a)(4)(B). In Agere Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Environmental Technology Corp., the court held that a party who, pursuant to a private settlement, had contributed money to a common fund used to pay for a
cleanup had “incurred” cleanup costs.255 The Third Circuit stated:
We do not think the Supreme Court intended to deprive the word
“incurred” of its ordinary meaning. Agere and TI put their money
in the pot right along with the money from the signers of the consent decrees. The costs they paid for were incurred at the same
time as the costs incurred by the signers of the consent decrees and
for the same work. Those costs were incurred in the ordinary sense
that a bill one obligates oneself to pay comes due as a job gets
done.256
Thus, these payments, although not directly used by the party to undertake
a cleanup, were nonetheless recoverable in an action under 107(a)(4)(B).
Courts have also relied on an alternative basis for concluding that costs
reimbursed under a non-judicial settlement may be recovered under
107(a)(4)(B). Parties who have reimbursed costs directly incurred by others
255.
2010).
256.

Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 225 (3rd Cir.
Id.
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can be assigned the claims of those parties.257 As one court stated: “Common sense dictates that § 107(a) is the appropriate vehicle for a party that,
as an assignee, ‘stands in the shoes’ of the true plaintiff in a § 107(a)
claim.”258 Thus, parties reimbursing others through a settlement are entitled
to assert the 107(a)(4)(B) claim as an assignee of the party who directly
incurred by the reimbursed party.259

CONCLUSION
Congress, through CERCLA, has created mechanisms to ensure that
contaminated property is cleaned up and that the polluter pays. Among
these mechanisms are three distinct private causes of action that allow responsible parties to share the costs of cleanup with other responsible parties. Unfortunately, Congress did a poor job drafting the relevant
provisions. In trying to ensure the availability of a right of contribution by
adding sections 113(f)(1) and 113(f)(3)(B), Congress created uncertainty as
to the application of these rights of contribution and their relationship to
the pre-existing right of cost recovery under 107(a)(4)(B).
Courts have expended much time, ink, and effort in resolving this uncertainty. The Supreme Court has twice addressed the issue, but the uncertainty has remained. Reliance on the plain text of CERCLA and fidelity to
the Supreme Court’s opinions produces a clear approach to resolving the
relationship between these sections. Where sections 107(a) and 113(f) textually overlap, the specific language of CERCLA and basic canons of construction require that section 113(f) provide the exclusive cause of action for
cost recovery. Ambiguity regarding the scope of 113(f) is resolved through
strict application of its text guided by the “traditional” meaning of contribution as described by the Supreme Court. The private causes of action are a
critical component of CERCLA. It is time for a measure of certainty and
stability regarding the application of the private causes of action under
CERCLA.

257.
See Am. Premier Underwriters Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 866 F. Supp. 2d 889,
903–04 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
258.
Moraine Properties, LLC v. Ethyl Corp., No. 3:07-CV-229, 2008 WL 4758692, at
*4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 2008).
259.
Some courts have rejected the argument that insurance companies can assert section 107(a)(4)(B) claims as a “subrogee” of the insured party. See, e.g., Chubb Custom Ins.
Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2013).
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